Chapter 10: Torts by Donovan, Peter A.
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law




Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Civil Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Donovan, Peter A. (1985) "Chapter 10: Torts," Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Vol. 1985, Article 14.
CHAPTERJO 
Torts 
PETER A. DONOVAN* 
§ 10.1. Governmental Immunity-Tort Claims Act-Public Duty Doc-
trine. For the third time in four years the Supreme Judicial Court has 
had to determine the relationship of the public duty doctrine• to the 
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. 2 In its first decision after enactment of 
the act,3 the Supreme Judicial Court held, in Dinsky v. Framingham,4 
that a homeowner could not recover from a municipality for damages 
sustained as a result of a negligently issued and enforced building permit. 
Under the building code, the Dinsky Court reasoned, the municipality's 
duty was owed to the general public and not to specific inhabitants of 
the municipality in their individual capacity as homeowners. 5 Applying 
the public duty doctrine, the Court held that liability would not exist "in 
the absence of a special duty owed to the plaintiffs, different from that 
owed to the public at large."6 Two years later, in Irwin v. Ware, 7 the 
Covrt limited the Dinsky holding to its special facts. Recognizing the 
"special relationship" existing between travelers on the public ways and 
the police, the Irwin Court held a municipality liable to travelers injured 
by intoxicated motorists negligently allowed to remain on the highway.8 
In distinguishing Dinsky, the Court noted that Dinsky involved a "rela-
tively leisurely course of events" whereas "the risk created by the neg-
ligence of [the] municipal employee [in Irwin was] of immediate and 
foreseeable personal injury to persons who [cannot] reasonably protect 
themselves from it."9 Obviously, Irwin narrowly interpreted the public 
duty doctrine that formed the basis of the Dinsky holding. During this 
* PETER A. DONOVAN is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. The 
author wishes to express his appreciation to Marie L. Appleby, a third year student at the 
Law School, for her invaluable research assistance in the preparation of this article. 
§ 10.1. 1 See, DONOVAN, TORTS, 1984 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW,§ 14.3, at 473. 
2 G. L. c. 258. 
3 The Tort Claims Act was enacted in 1978 and became effective on July 20, 1978. Acts 
of 1978, c. 512, § 15. 
4 386 Mass. 801, 438 N.E.2d 51 (1982). 
5 Dinsky, 386 Mass. at 810, 438 N.E.2d at 55. 
6 /d. at 810, 438 N.E.2d at 56. 
7 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984). 
8 /d, at 762, 467 N.E.2d at 1303-04. 
9 /d. at 756, 467 N.E.2d at 1300. 
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Survey year, the Court addressed the issue whether both the Dinsky and 
Irwin precedents could continue to exist in harmony under the Tort 
Claims Act. On the basis of a factual record presenting the negligent 
enforcement of the state building code and related statutes, the Court 
concluded that both Dinsky and Irwin continue to have precedential value 
under the act. 
In Ribeiro v. Granby, 10 the plaintiff's decedent perished in his second 
floor apartment from smoke inhalation and asphyxiation. The plaintiff 
alleged the death occurred as a result of the negligence of town officials 
in failing to compel the landlord to construct a second means of egress 
from each floor of the building as required by the building code11 and 
related statutes. 12 The building had a history of health code violations 
and the landlord was specifically notified of the egress violation in 1981. 13 
The letter of notification specified what type of exit would be acceptable 
and ordered that the work be done within ten days. 14 The death of the 
decedent occurred approximately one year after the landlord had given 
assurances at a meeting of the town's board of health that a second exit 
would be constructed. 15 The second exit was never built. 16 
In denying liability, the town argued that Ribeiro was "another inspec-
tion" case controlled by Dinsky and that no "special duty" existed be-
cause "there was no intention in the statutes or the State building code 
to create private causes of action on behalf of purchasers of premises 
which were developed in violation of governmental requirements." 17 On 
the other hand, the plaintiff argued that Irwin was the controlling prec-
edent because "injury and death followed from the failure of public 
authorities to take affirmative action after discovering the danger in pur-
suance of their statutory duties. "18 Moreover, while Dinsky involved only 
property damages, Ribeiro involved personal injuries as foreseeable as 
those in Irwin. 
The Court agreed that Dinsky was not controlling merely because 
Ribeiro was another "inspection case. "19 The Court also agreed that the 
statutes on which the plaintiff relied "contain[ed] language which, like 
10 395 Mass. 608, 481 N.E.2d 466 (1985). 
11 A provision of the building code required that "[a]ny existing building shall provide at 
least two (2) means of egress serving every story which are acceptable to the building 
official." 780 Code Mass. Regs. § 2203.7 
12 G. L. c. 143, §§ 6, 9. 




17 Id. at 611, 481 N.E.2d at 468. 
18 Id. at 612, 481 N.E.2d at 468. 
19 Id. at 611-12, 481 N.E.2d at 468. 
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the relevant legislation in Irwin, indicat[ed] that the Legislature intended 
to protect individual members of the public." Nonetheless, the Court 
determined that Irwin was not controlling and affirmed the dismissal of 
the action against the town. The Court stated that Irwin was inapposite 
because "the case before us, while tragic, presents a 'relatively leisurely 
course of events. "'20 In Ribeiro, "[t]he danger was discernible for many 
months before the harm occurred" and during this time "the occupants 
themselves could have taken measures to rectify or avoid the danger. "21 
In contrast, in Irwin, the threat (intoxicated driving) was "immediate" 
and "short-lived" and the motoring public "had no chance to protect 
themselves."22 Finally, the Court noted that "public agencies lack 'the 
resources necessary to police the entire housing sector. "'23 Thus, despite 
the statutes, the Court concluded no special duty existed. 
While the Court's application of the public duty doctrine precluded the 
plaintiff's recovery in the first of this year's cases, the doctrine was held 
inapplicable in the second. In Doherty v. Belmont,24 the plaintiff was 
injured when she tripped over a bump in a median strip in a public 
parking lot in which she had parked her automobile.25 The "bump" in 
actuality was the protruding remains of a parking meter post which had 
not been leveled. Upholding a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the Court 
rejected Dinsky and instead found Irwin controlling. 
The Doherty Court reasoned that the town's duty did not arise from 
the "general language of a regulatory or criminal statute, but rather from 
the town's status as a landowner. "26 In its capacity as a landowner, the 
Court explained, the municipality was indistinguishable from a private 
landowner and, therefore, owed a duty of reasonable care to all persons 
lawfully upon its premises. 27 Since the plaintiff was lawfully upon the 
premises-indeed, even a paying patron of the parking lot-there was no 
error in submitting to the jury the question whether the town had violated 
its duty of care toward her. 
20 Id. at 612, 481 N.E.2d at 468 (citing Irwin v. Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 756, 467 N.E.2d 
1292, 1300 (1984)). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 611, 481 N.E.2d at 469 (quoting Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 
184, 192, 293 N.E.2d 831, 839 (1973)). 
24 396 Mass. 271, 485 N.E.2d 183 (1985). 
2s Id. at 272, 485 N.E.2d at 184. 
26 Id. at 273, 485 N.E.2d at 185 (citing G.L. c. 258, § 2 (1984 ed.), providing that 
municipalities are liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual 
under like circumstances."). 
27 Id. at 273, 485 N.E.2d at 185 (citing Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 
(1973)). 
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§ 10.2. Governmental Immunity-Tort Claims Act-Discretionary Func-
tions. Under the Tort Claims Act, public employers retain immunity from 
claims based upon the performance of discretionary acts.' Last year, in 
Irwin v. Ware, 2 the Supreme Judicial Court held that not every act that 
involves an element of discretion is immunized from liability by the 
discretionary function exemption. 3 Rather, the Court explained, the ex-
emption is limited to the formulation of policy and planning as contrasted 
with acts executing previously established policies or plans.4 Applying 
the policy-implementation distinction, the Irwin Court held that a police 
officer's decision whether to remove an intoxicated driver from the high-
way was not a discretionary act, but rather, the execution of a legislative 
policy.5 During the year, in Doherty v. Belmont,6 the Court again defined 
a "discretionary function" by what it is not. It remains to be seen what 
are policy and planning decisions which will be protected by the excep-
tion. 
In Doherty, the town had redesigned its parking lot, switching from an 
individual parking meter system to a single parking ticket dispenser at 
the entrance to the lot. 7 The town contended that it was immune from 
liability for any negligence in effectuating this change because "the de-
cision to effect certain repairs in a public parking lot is a discretionary 
function within the meaning of [the act]. "8 Disagreeing, the Court stated 
that the issue was not whether the decision to remove the parking meters 
constituted a discretionary function, but rather whether the maintenance 
of the parking lot in the furtherance of this decision falls within the 
exemption from liability. 9 The Court concluded that it did not: "[A]ny 
negligence in performing, or failing to perform, the ministerial task of 
maintenance does not rise to the level of 'public policy or planning' 
decisions warranting protection under G.L. c. 258, § lO(b). " 10 
§ 10.3. Governmental Immunity-Tort Claims Act-Relationship to 
Other Immunity Statutes--Standards of Negligence. In enacting the Tort 
Claims Act, the Legislature abolished governmental immunity as the 
general rule and provided that public employers were to be liable "in the 
§ 10.2. I G.L. c. 258, § JO(b). 
2 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984). 
'ld. at 753, 467 N.E.2d at 1298. 
4 /d. at 753, 467 N.E.2d at 1298-99. 
'/d. 
6 396 Mass. 271, 485 N.E.2d 183 (1985). 
7 /d. at 272, 485 N.E.2d at 184. 
8 /d. at 276, 485 N.E.2d at 186. 
9Jd. 
10 /d. at 276, 485 N.E.2d at 187. 
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same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances."1 The Tort Claims Act expressly stated, however, that it 
does not "supersede or repeal" General Laws chapter 84 sections 15-242 
which make municipalities liable in an amount not exceeding $5,000 for 
certain defects in "public" ways. Under Dakin v. Somerville, 3 however, 
this liability does not extend to "park" roads. In its 1984 decision in 
Intriligator v. Boston,4 the Appeals Court addressed the question whether 
immunity for defects in private ways survived enactment of the Tort 
Claims Act. Reading the statutes literally, the Appeals Court held that 
park roads fell within the coverage of the Tort Claims Act since they 
were not covered by chapter 84. In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
relied upon the mandate of the construction clause of the Tort Claims 
Act5 that it "shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the 
purposes thereof .... "6 As a consequence of the Appeals Court opinion, 
a person injured on a park road could recover up to $100,000 in damages 
under the Tort Claims Act, while a person injured on a public way would 
be limited to $5,000 in damages under chapter 84. During the Survey 
year, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Appeals Court/ finding 
its literal approach "not faithful to the general intent of the Tort Claims 
Act."8 
The Intriligator plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on an 
accumulation of snow and ice on a sidewalk stipulated to constitute a 
park way. Had she slipped on a public way, the Supreme Judicial Court 
noted, she would not have been able to recover for her injuries because 
chapter 84, section 17 precludes liability "for an injury or damage sus-
tained on a public way by reason of snow or ice thereon." The Court 
was unable to perceive how the Legislature could have intended that 
municipalities should have a $5,000 limit for most injuries caused by 
defects in public ways, no liability at all for injuries caused by snow and 
ice on public ways, and yet "suddenly ... should be potentially liable 
in a far greater amount" under the Tort Claims Act "for injuries negli-
gently caused by snow and ice on park roads."9 Faced with this quandary, 
the Court concluded it "should fashion 'an adjunct to [chapters 84 and 
§ 10.3. ' G.L. c. 258, § 2 (1984 ed.). 
2 Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 18, enacting G.L. c. 258, § 18. 
3 262 Mass. 514, 515-16, 160 N .E. 260, 261 (1928). 
4 18 Mass. App. Ct. 703, 469 N.E.2d 1296 (1984); See DONOVAN, TORTS, 1984 ANN. 
SuRv. MASS. LAW§ 14.5, at 478. 
'G.L. c. 258, § 18, inserted by St. 1978 c. 512, § 18. 
6 See, DONOVAN, TORTS, 1984 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW, §§ 14.5, 14.6 at 478, 480. 
7 395 Mass. 489, 480 N.E.2d 1002 (1985). 
8 /d. at 491,480 N.E.2d at 1003. 
9 /d. at 492-93, 480 N.E.2d at 1004. 
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258] called for by the sense of ('hose) section(s) in relation to the legis-
lation as a whole. "'10 
In fashioning its adjunct to the statutes, the Court relied upon Mailot 
v. Travelers Insurance Co., 11 in which a person claiming personal injury 
benefits under the no fault motor vehicle law12 also claimed benefits for 
the same injury under the worker's compensation law.B The no fault 
statute was silent concerning the effect of other coverage.J4 Instead of 
allowing the plaintiff to recover benefits from both sources, the Court 
fashioned an adjunct to the no fault statute. 15 The Mailot Court justified 
its judicial legislation with the statement that "casual overstatements and 
understatements, half answers, and gaps in the statutory provisions" 
require the courts "to interweave the statute with decisions answering 
the difficulties and composing, as far as feasible and reasonable an har-
monious structure faithful to the basic design and purpose of the Legis-
lature. " 16 
In arriving at the conclusion that a municipality should not be liable 
for injuries caused solely by snow and ice whether on a public or a park 
road, 17 the Court utilized an additional line of reasoning. The Court's 
starting point was that while the Tort Claims Act "eliminated govern-
mental immunity" in many instances, it did not "create liability."18 To 
determine whether a public employer will be held liable in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances, therefore, it must first be determined whether a private individual 
would be liable under the same circumstances. Reasoning that "[t]he 
Legislature has expressed a policy that no municipality shall be liable for 
injuries caused solely by snow and ice on a public way"19 and that "the 
common law rule should bar recovery for injuries caused in circum-
stances that are substantially identical,"20 the Court concluded that no 
liability should exist for injuries caused solely by snow and ice on a park 
road. 21 
10 /d. at 493, 480 N.E.2d at 1004 (citing Mailot v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 Mass. 342, 348, 
377 N.E.2d 681, 684 (1978)). 
11 375 Mass. 342, 348. 377 N.E.2d 681, 684 (1978). 
12 G.L. c. 90, § 34A. 
13 G.L. c. 152. 
14 Mailot, 375 Mass. at 348, 377 N.E.2d at 684. 
15 /d. 
16 /d. at 345, 377 N.E.2d at 682. 
17 Intriligator, 395 Mass. at 493, 480 N.E.2d at 1004. 
18 /d. at 493, 480 N.E.2d at 1004 (quoting Dinsky, 386 Mass. at 804, 438 N.E.2d at 51, 
53 (1982)). 
19 /d. at 494, 480 N.E.2d at 1004. 
20 Id. at 494, 480 N.E.2d at 1005. 
21 /d. at 489, 480 N.E.2d at 1003. 
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Intriligator leaves many questions unanswered. As written, it ad-
dresses only the question of snow and ice liability. The broader issue of 
determining the relationship between the Tort Claims Act and chapter 
84, together with the anomolous park road-public way distinction created 
by that relationship, remains unanswered. In a final footnote the Court 
urged the Legislature to address this issue even if it agreed with the 
Intriligator result. 
Doherty v. Belmont22 presented another aspect of the relationship be-
tween chapter 84 and the Tort Claims Act. In that case, the Supreme 
Judicial Court addressed the issue whether cases decided under chapter 
84, section 15, would be controlling in determining standards of negli-
gence under the Tort Claims Act. The Court decided that they would 
not. 
In Doherty, the Court noted that it had previously been decided under 
chapter 84, section 15, that "extremely minor imperfections on public 
ways did not constitute actionable defects."23 In one case, for example, 
the Court held that no defect existed where a sidewalk slab tilted three-
fourths of an inch above the rest of the sidewalk. 24 In another, the Court 
held that no actionable defect existed where a cement sidewalk had 
separated one inch from the granite curbing. 25 In Doherty, the remains 
of the parking meter over which the plaintiff tripped protruded only one-
half to three-fourths of an inch above the median strip. 26 Based upon the 
chapter 84 precedents, the town argued that this minimal protrusion could 
not, as a matter of law, constitute a negligent defectY The Court, how-
ever, disagreed. 
Unlike the plaintiffs in the chapter 84 precedents, the Doherty plaintiff 
was not injured on a public way. Accordingly, the Court held common 
law standards of negligence, and not precedent under chapter 84, section 
15, controlling.28 Furthermore, the Court found the chapter 84 precedents 
"unpersuasive even by way of analogy" because "the policy considera-
tions underlying [them] ... [were] not present in the case at bar."29 
Decisions designed to protect municipalities from liability "for slight or 
trivial imperfections in public ways which might be caused by weather 
conditions or traffic patterns," the Court stated, have no relevance to 
22 396 Mass. 271, 485 N .E.2d 183 (1985). 
23 Id. 
24 Velante v. Watertown, 300 Mass. 207, 208, 14 N.E.2d 955, 956 (1938). 
25 Galante v. Brockton, 305 Mass. 480,481, 26 N.E.2d 341, 342 (1940). 
26 Doherty, 396 Mass. at 276, 485 N.E.2d at 186. 
27 Jd. at 274, 485 N.E.2d at 185. 
28 Jd. at 274, 485 N.E.2d at 186 (citing Gallant v. Worcester, 383 Mass. 707, 714, 421 
N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (1981)). 
29 Jd. at 275, 485 N.E.2d at 186. 
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situations where the accident producing defect was "caused by a human 
act or omission, and not by extraneous factors beyond the town's con-
trol. "30 
On the issue of negligence itself, the Court admitted that even at 
common law a defect might be so trivial that it would not constitute 
negligence. 31 The test is whether a "defect is so minor or insubstantial 
that a reasonable person would not have anticipated injury and guarded 
against it. "32 Applying this test, the Court held that the metal stub was 
not so insubstantial that it could not constitute negligence as a matter of 
law. 33 A jury question was posed because the town knew that pedestrians 
walked on the median and that the parking meter stubs posed a risk to 
members of the public and yet failed to take steps to eliminate the risk. 34 
§ 10.4. Governmental Immunity-Tort Claims Act-Private Nuisance. 
Prior to the passage of the Tort Claims Act, the Supreme Judicial Court 
held in Morash & Sons v. Commonwealth that "the commonwealth is 
not immune from liability if it creates or maintains a private nuisance 
which causes injuries to the real property of another. " 1 During the Survey 
year, in H. Sacks & Sons, Inc. v. Metropolitan District Commission, 2 
the plaintiff brought an action against the MDC to recover for damage to 
personal property as a result of the negligence of the Commission in the 
operation of a dam. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings 
dismissing the negligence action because the events transpired before the 
passage of the Tort Claims Act. 3 Following leave to amend, the plaintiff 
added a nuisance count to his complaint, but this proved unsuccessful. 
The Court granted summary judgment for the MDC, this time on the 
grounds that the plaintiff was suing for injury to personal property and 
Morash expressly authorized suit only for "injury to the real property of 
another. "4 In reversing and remanding the case for trial, the Appeals 
Court concluded that the trial court had read the Morash opinion too 
restrictively. 5 
30 /d. 
31 /d. at 276, 485 N.E.2d at 186. 
32 /d. (citing Pastrick v. S. S. Kresge Co., 288 Mass. 194, 192 N.E. 485 (1934)). 
33 /d. 
34 /d. 
§ 10.4. 1 363 Mass. 612, 619, 296 N .E.2d 461, 465 (1973). 
2 20 Mass. App. Ct. 45, 477 N.E.2d 1067 (1985). 
3 /d. at 46, 477 N.E.2d at 1067-68. The damage occurred on January 19, 1977, while the 
Tort Cairns Act did not become effective until August 16, 1977. Acts of 1978, c. 512 was 
approved July 20, 1978, and by § 16 made effective upon passage and applicable to all 
causes of action on or after August 16, 1977. 
4 Sacks, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 47, 477 N.E.2d at 1068. 
5 /d. 
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The court first noted that the question whether the Commonwealth 
was liable in nuisance for damage to personal property remained open 
and was not precluded by Morash. Since Morash involved only damage 
to realty, the Morash Court "did not need to address a question of damage 
to personal property .... "6 The Sacks Court then observed that the 
decision to extend liability to cover personal property "is nothing more 
than a logical extension of the decision in Morash. "7 
In finding the state liable, the Morash Court was influenced by the fact 
that municipalities already had been held liable for private nuisances. 8 
The Court could see "no logical reason why the Commonwealth should 
not be similarly liable. "9 The precedential significance of Morash, 10 there-
fore, lay not in some unfortunate language pertaining to the type of 
property that had been damaged, but in the Court's willingness to make 
state responsibility coextensive with that of the municipalities It is clear 
that "[t]he liability of a municipality as owner of land or of a building for 
a private nuisance is the same as that of a natural person." 11 Natural 
persons are liable to tenants 12 and recovery is allowed for personal, as 
well as real, property. 13 Hence, it was no defense that the Sacks plaintiff 
was only a tenant upon property owned by the MDC or that the only 
property damaged was personal. Since the liability of a private person in 
nuisance extends to personal property, it follows that governmental lia-
bility for nuisance also extends to personal property. 14 The public policy 
is clear. "There [must] be no oases of nonliability where a private nuis-
ance may be maintained with impunity. "15 
§ 10.5. Gpvernmental Immunity-Tort Claims Act-Statute of Limita-
tions-Presentment-Minors. The Tort Claims Act requires that claims 
be presented to the executive officer of a public employer within two 
6 /d. at 47 n.2, 477 N.E.2d at 1068 n.2: 
7 /d. at 48 n.3, 477 N.E.2d at 1069 n.3. 
'ld. at 47, 477 N.E.2d at 1068. 
9 Morash, 363 Mass. at 616, 296 N.E. at 465. 
10 Sacks, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 47, 477 N.E.2d at 1068. 
11 Sacks, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 47, 477 N.E.2d at 1068 (emphasis supplied by the Court) 
(quoting Kurtigan v. Worcester, 348 Mass. 284, 288, 203 N.E.2d 692, 694 (1965)). 
12 /d. at 47,477 N.E.2d at 1069 (citing United Elec. Light Co. v. Deliso Constr. Co., 315 
Mass. 313, 321, 52 N.E.2d 553, 358 (1943); Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works Co., 2 Allen 
(84 Mass) 524, 526 (1861)). 
13 /d. at 47, 477 N.E.2d at 1069 (citing United Elec. Light Co. v. Deliso Constr Co., 315 
Mass. at 319, 52 N.E.2d at 557). 
14 /d. at 47, 477 N.E.2d at 1068-69. 
15 /d. at 48, 477 N.E.2d at 1069 (citing Kurtigan v. Worcester, 348 Mass. 284, 291, 203 
N.E.2d 692, 696 (1965)). 
9
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years, 1 and suit be commenced within three years,2 after the cause of 
action arises. During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court had 
the opportunity to determine the applicability of these provisions to the 
tort claims of minors. After determining that they were distinct require-
ments, the Court applied them in a seemingly inconsistent manner. In 
Hernandez v. Boston,3 the Court held that General Laws chapter 260, 
section 7, the general tolling statute applicable to actions by minors, 
would also apply under the Tort Claims Act. In contrast, in George v. 
Saugus,4 the Court ruled that the presentment requirement was not af-
fected by chapter 260, section 7, even though the plaintiff had not attained 
the age of majority. 
In Hernandez, suit was not commenced until five years after the minor 
was struck by a motor vehicle allegedly operated by a police officer in a 
negligent manner. 5 The municipality moved to dismiss because suit was 
not instituted within the three year period of the Tort Claims Act. 6 The 
minor sought the protection of General Laws chapter 260, section 7, the 
general tolling statute, which provides that: "If the person ... is a minor 
... when a right to bring an action first accrues, the action may be 
commenced within the time provided by the statute upon which the cause 
of action is based after the disability is removed." However, the scope 
of this protection is curtailed by the additional provision of chapter 260, 
section 19, which provides that "[i]f a special provision is otherwise made 
relative to the limitation of any action, any provision of this chapter 
inconsistent therewith shall not apply." Ruling that section 4 of the Tort 
Claims Act was such a "special statute," the trial court dismissed the 
suit. 7 The trial judge also ruled that the tolling provision "does not apply 
to [the Tort Claims Act] since the action herein is not a common law 
action but rather is an action created by the Legislature."8 The Supreme 
Judicial Court granted direct appellate review and reversed.9 
The Court first decided that, in enacting the Tort Claims Act, the 
Legislature did not intend to provide for a shortened statute of limitations 
for minors. 10 Such an intent was clear in other statutes such as the medical 
§ 10.5. 1 G. L. c. 258, § 4, inserted by St. 1978, c. 512, § 15. 
2 ld. 
3 394 Mass. 45, 474 N.E.2d 166 (1985). 
4 394 Mass. 40, 474 N.E.2d 169 (1985). 




9 Id. at 45-46, 474 N.E.2d at 167. 
10 ld. at 47, 474 N.E.2d at 167. The Court relied upon its decision last year in Irwin v. 
Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 770 n.ll, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1308 n.ll (1984) ("[T]he Legislature did 
not provide a shortened statute of limitations for minors .... Thus, G.L. c. 260, § 7, 
10
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malpractice statute of limitations established for minors which was ex-
pressly made applicable "notwithstanding the provisions of" chapter 260, 
section 7. 11 The medical malpractice statute, not the Tort Claims Act, 
the Court found, "epitomizes the 'special provision' contemplated in G. 
L. chapter 260, section 19. "12 The Court also reasoned that the adoption 
of the same limitation period in the Tort Claims Act as in chapter 260, 
section 4, indicated that a special shortened limitation period was not 
intended. 13 On this reasoning the Court distinguished its previous ruling 
in Weaver v. Commonwealth, 14 that "[w]here a cause of action is created 
by a statute which also places a limitation on the existence of the right, 
the tolling provisions of the general statute of limitations (General Laws 
chapter 260), do not apply."15 The short answer, said the Court, is that 
the adoption of the same three-year period in both statutes shows that 
the Legislature did not intend any special shortened limitation period. 16 
Thus, the Court again ruled that "a special provision" to the contrary 
does not exist under chapter 260, section 19, unless it is "made relevant" 
to chapter 260 by the legislature. Attempting to offer a practical policy 
reason for adopting a shortened limitation period, the city also argued in 
Hernandez that it would not be able to plan effectively for unknown 
future liability if the three-year limitation period were tolled. 17 In light of 
its decision the same day in George that the two-year presentment re-
quirement must be met regardless of the age of the claimant, the Court 
found this argument unavailing. 18 
In George, the Court concluded that the presentment period and the 
limitation period were two distinct temporal requirements. Because chap-
ter 260 was addressed to limitation periods and was not expressly appli-
cable to the presentment requirement of chapter 258, the issue before 
the Court was whether it should apply by analogy. 19 In concluding that 
it should not, the Court first noted that the Tort Claims Act had two 
principal purposes: (1) providing for recovery for valid tort claims against 
governmental entities; and (2) providing a mechanism to ensure that only 
operates to toll the period of limitations for claims brought on behalf of minors entitled to 
recover under the [Tort Claims Act]."). 
11 G.L. c. 231, § 60D requires that a medical malpractice action by a minor be brought 
within three years unless the minor is under six years of age, in which case the minor may 
initiate suit until such time as he attains the age of nine. 
12 Hernandez, 394 Mass. at 47, 474 N.E.2d at 168. 
13 /d. at 48, 474 N.E.2d at 168. 
14 387 Mass. 43, 50, 438 N.E.2d 831, 836 (1982). 
1
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valid claims are paid. 20 In accommodating these divergent goals, the 
Court had "to strike '(a)n appropriate balance ... between the public 
interest in fairness to injured persons and in promoting effective govern-
ment. "'21 Tolling of the presentment requirement could defeat the second 
purpose. The receipt of untimely notice of a claim could make it impos-
sible for a municipality to investigate adequately and defend against 
unmeritorious claims.22 In concluding that it was not unfair to hold a 
minor to the presentment requirement, the Court reiterated its position 
that "[t]he Legislature may assume 'that the interest of minors will be 
protected by their guardians, or by others who are near to them. "'23 
Neither Hernandez nor George explains why this argument should be 
deemed compelling in the case of presentment but not in the case of 
limitation. Obviously, both requirements are intended to protect parties 
from stale claims. One is left to wonder why staleness under one statute 
is more important than staleness under the other. The Court did not 
attempt to answer this question except to say that notice requirements 
under other statutes have been found "not unfair as applied to minors."24 
§ 10.6. Negligence-Medical Malpractice-Physician's Duty to Disclose. 
Three years ago in Harnish v. Children's Medical Center, 1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court concluded that "a physician owes to his patient the duty 
to disclose in a reasonable manner all significant medical information that 
the physician possesses or reasonably should possess that is material to 
an intelligent decision by the patient whether to undergo a proposed 
procedure." Harnish adopted an objective standard of "materiality" de-
fining it as "the significance a reasonable person, in what the physician 
knows or should know is the patient's position, would attach to the 
disclosed risk or risks in deciding whether to submit or not to submit to 
20 George, 394 Mass. at 40, 474 N.E.2d at 172. 
21 /d. at 42, 474 N.E.2d at 171 (citing Vasys v. M.D.C., 387 Mass. 51, 57, 438 N.E.2d 
836, 841 (1982)). 
22 /d. at 44, 474 N.E.2d at 172. 
23 /d. at 43, 474 N.E.2d at 171 (quoting Cioffi v. Guenther, 374 Mass. I, 4, 370 N.E.2d 
1003, 1005 (1977)). 
24 /d. at 43, 474 N.E.2d at 171. Plaintiff's estoppel argument in George was equally 
unsuccessful. She argued that since settlement negotiations had begun within the limitation 
period, the town was estopped from relying upon her untimeliness in presenting her claim. 
/d. at 40, 474 N.E.2d at 172. The Court again disagreed stating that for estoppel the plaintiff 
must show that the conduct of the defendant had induced her to do something different 
from what she otherwise would have done. ld. Since the plaintiff did not make contact 
with the town's insurers until several months after the two year limit, no action by the 
defendant could possibly have caused her to delay presentment of her claim. /d. 
§ 10.6. 1 387 Mass. 152, 155, 439 N.E.2d 240, 243 (1982). See, DoNOVAN, ToRTS, 1982 
ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§§ 11.4, at 373. 
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surgery or treatment."2 This Survey year, in Precourt v. Frederick, 3 the 
Court had to decide the factual predicate upon which a particular risk 
could be found to be material and hence a risk that should have been 
disclosed. 
In Precourt, the plaintiffs4 brought a negligence action against an oph-
thalmic surgeon for negligently prescribing the drug Prednisone after two 
eye operations. The drug allegedly damaged the patient's hip causing 
aseptic necrosis, an irreversible musculoskeletal side effect of the drug 
which involves the death of the bones of the joint. 5 Alleging that the 
doctor knew or should have known of the drug's side effects, the plaintiffs 
alleged that it was negligent for the doctor to prescribe the drug without 
informing them of the risk of aseptic necrosis.6 Verdicts were returned 
for the plaintiffs and the doctor appealed the denial of his motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdicts. The Supreme Judicial Court took 
the case on its own motion7 and reversed the judgment for the plaintiffs 
ruling "as a matter of law" that the risk of aseptic necrosis was not 
"material," because the plaintiffs had failed to show that "the likelihood" 
of aseptic necrosis "was other than negligible. "8 
The Court arrived at this conclusion despite the testimony of medical 
experts that aseptic necrosis was a known side effect of the drug and 
that the patient should have been warned about it. The defendant testified 
that he had practiced ophthalmology since 1963, and had prescribed 
Prednisone in fifty to seventy-five percent of his surgical cases without 
incident. 9 However, he also admitted that he "knew from reading, at-
tending conferences and meetings, and discussions with colleagues, of 
an association between Prednisone and aseptic necrosis. " 10 The signifi-
cance of these admissions was developed in other testimony. 
An opthalmologist testified that, "in his opinion, before prescribing 
Prednisone for a patient a physician should inform the patient of the 
major risks of Prednisone use" and that "aseptic necrosis was one of 
those risks." 11 The same doctor also testified that because the patient 
"had 'hypertension and arthritis and a history of alcohol consumption as 
well as kidney stones,' [he] should have been informed that the Predni-
2 /d. at 156, 439 N.E.2d at 243. 
3 395 Mass. 689, 481 N.E.2d 1144 (1985). 
4 In addition to the malpractice claim, the complaint included a count on behalf of the 
patient's wife to recover for loss of consortium. 
5 Precourt, 395 Mass. at 692-93, 481 N.E.2d at 1147. 
6 /d. at 690-91, 481 N.E.2d at 1146. 
7 /d. at 691, 481 N.E.2d at 1146. 
8 /d. at 696, 481 N.E.2d at 1149. 




Donovan: Chapter 10: Torts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1985
304 1985 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 10.6 
sone 'could cause additional complications to those systems ... [and 
that] the musculoskeletal system ... could have been made worse with 
osteoporosis or [aseptic] necrosis. "'12 Another doctor, an internist, tes-
tified that "a physician 'is obliged to make warning statements regarding 
possibilities that the medicine may alter or change' medical conditions 
such as those contained in [the plaintiff's] history." 13 He further testified 
that "patients who have [the] associated medical conditions [of the plain-
tiff], such as alcohol consumption or other such metabolic conditions," 
constitute "a high risk for the development of . . . aseptic necrosis of the 
bone or hip. "14 This same expert testified that "the side effects of Pred-
nisone relates [sic] directly to the amount of Prednisone taken and the 
length of time that the patient takes it [and] that [the plaintiff's] treatment 
included a 'high dose, long course of therapy,' and that, in his opinion, 
the cumulative effect of the courses of Prednisone that [the plaintiff] took 
caused [the plaintiff] to develop aseptic necrosis."15 
This last testimony characterizing the plaintiff's dosage of Prednisone 
as "high" and his treatment as "long,'' in combination with the other 
testimony of the "cumulative effect" of the drug, the Court ruled, "does 
not permit the inference that [the defendant physician] reasonably should 
have recognized the possibility that [the plaintiff] would develop aseptic 
necrosis was material to [the plaintiff's] decision to undergo treatment." 16 
Without citing any medical bases for its position, the Court dismissed 
the expert testimony that "the risk was 'high,'" stating: '"High' is a 
relative word. It could mean one in ten, but it could just as well mean 
one in a million."17 
The expert medical testimony that the defendant "'should have' made 
a disclosure that he did not make" was similarly dismissed as an "essen-
tially legal conclusion. " 18 Finally, the Court ruled that the plaintiff could 
not reasonably have taken the doctor's statement that he had "everything 
to gain and nothing to lose" as meaning that the proposed treatment was 
risk free. 19 
The Precourt decision seems clearly wrong. It is impossible to recon-
cile it with the Court's statement of its duty to "construe the evidence 
most favorably to the plaintiff and [to] disregard that favorable to the 
defendant" in reviewing the denial of a judgment notwithstanding the 
12 /d. at 693-94, 481 N.E.2d at 1148. 
13 Id. at 694, 481 N.E.2d at 1148. 
14Jd. 
15 /d. 
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verdict. 20 Applying this standard to the medical testimony in the case 
should have led the Court to the conclusion that the plaintiff was in a 
high risk category of developing aseptic necrosis. If, medically speaking, 
the plaintiff were in a high risk category, it was wrong for the Court to 
conclude that the likelihood may only have been "negligible." As Justice 
Liacos pointed out in his concurring opinion, 21 the majority acted "with-
out foundation in fact or law."22 He particularly could not understand the 
majority's dismissal of the medical testimony that the plaintiff was a 
"high risk": 
I do not understand the court's facile dismissal of this important testimony 
of an expert witness. "High" is indeed a relative term, and this expert ih 
effect testified that [the plaintiff] was a high risk, relative to other persons, 
for the development of aseptic necrosis. I think this is just the type of 
evidence contemplated by those courts that have called for expert testi-
mony on "the nature of the harm which may result and the probability of 
its occurrence. "23 
Equally perplexing is the majority's cavalier conclusion that the doc-
tors were expressing a legal conclusion, not a medical opinion, when 
they opined that the plaintiff should have been warned of the risk of 
aseptic necrosis. In offering this testimony the doctors were clearly not 
stating legal conclusions. Rather, they were stating their opinion of the 
medical standard of care to which physicians must conform. This is 
precisely the kind of testimony that is routinely utilized to establish the 
standard of care in professional malpractice cases. 24 
It is not clear precisely what changes Precourt will require in traditional 
Massachusetts practice. Perhaps attorneys can adjust to the Court's one-
in-a-million-objection by asking medical experts to quantify on a per-
centage basis all of their professional opinions. Whether this is possible 
or not, it does not address the other glaring inadequacy of the majority 
opinion. It does not tell lawyers what they must do to be sure that the 
Court will recognize that medical witnesses are testifying to an appro-
priate medical standard of physician care. From the majority opinion in 
20 Jd. at 691, 481 N.E.2d at 1146. 
21 Justice Liacos disagreed with the majority's opinion although he concurred in the 
result. Justice Liacos noted that the plaintiff had two separate operations after both of 
which Prednisone was prescribed. The plaintiff admitted that he would have undergone the 
first operation even if he had been warned of the risk of aseptic necrosis. However, Justice 
Liacos was unable to find sufficient evidence that the plaintiff's condition "was caused by 
the drug therapy administered after the second operation." ld. at 703, 439 N.E.2d at 1153. 
Accordingly, in his opinion, the plaintiff had not connected the negligence to the harm. I d. 
22 Jd. at 699, 481 N.E.2d at 1150. 
23 Jd. at 701-02 n.2, 481 N.E.2d at 1152 n.2. 
24 See, e.g., Forlano v. Hughes, 393 Mass. 502, 471 N.E.2d 1315 (1984); Collins v. Baron, 
392 Mass. 565, 467 N.E.2d 171 (1984); Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 181 N.E.2d 
562 (1962). 
15
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Precourt, however, it is clear that testimony as to what a doctor "should 
have" done, for reasons unknown, may not be enough to get a case to a 
jury. The Precourt majority has provided no help at all on this important 
question. There is not even a hint in the opinion as to why the Court 
refused to accept the "should have" testimony as establishing a medical 
standard of care. 
§ 10.7. Negligence-Legal Malpractice. In Fishman v. Brooks, 1 the de-
fendant was injured in an automobile accident in 1975 and shortly there-
after retained the plaintiff as his attorney. The plaintiff, who had not tried 
a case since 1961 because he was primarily engaged in real estate con-
veyancing, did not commence suit for sixteen months and then delayed 
service of process for another ten months. He did little or no investigation 
of the accident and "engaged in no useful pretrial discovery. "2 In April, 
1978, after trial had been scheduled for June, the plaintiff consulted with 
another attorney, more experienced in personal injury cases, but failed 
to agree on an equal split of his fee. 3 Thereafter, the plaintiff made a 
$250,000 settlement demand which was refused. 4 On the eve of trial, the 
plaintiff was still unprepared to try the case and told the defendant that 
he could not win if he went to trial. 5 The defendant finally settled for 
$160,000.6 
Initially, the case sub judice arose out of a complaint filed by the 
attorney claiming that the defendant client had violated one of the terms 
of their fee agreement. 7 The plaintiff eventually abandoned this claim but 
did not dismiss the action before the defendant filed a counterclaim 
containing both a malpractice and an abuse of process count. The trial 
jury hearing the counterclaim found the plaintiff negligent in his handling 
of the personal injury suit and awarded the defendant damages in the 
amount of $525,000 on the malpractice count and $10,000 on the abuse 
of process count. 8 The trial court reduced the malpractice award to reflect 
the defendant's contributory fault in the accident, the amount of the 
medical expenses already paid and the amount the defendant personally 
received from the settlement.9 The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 
The basic principles of legal malpractice applicable to Fishman were 
§ 10.7. 1 396 Mass. 643, 487 N.E.2d 1377 (1986). 





7 /d. at 644, 487 N.E.2d at 1378. 
8 /d. at 645-46, 487 N.E.2d at 1379. 
9 /d. at 646, 487 N.E.2d at 1379. 
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clear. "An attorney who has not held himself out as a specialist owes his 
client a duty to exercise the degree of care and skill of the average 
qualified practitioner. " 10 The attorney who breaches this duty will be 
liable "for any reasonably foreseeable loss caused by his negligence."'' 
Under this approach, an attorney will be liable when he "negligently 
cause[s] a client to settle a claim for an amount below what a properly 
represented client would have accepted. " 12 Fishman provides the classic 
example of a case of this genre where an attorney has improperly pre-
pared a case or lacks the ability to handle it properly and "causes his 
client to accept a settlement not reasonable in the circumstances."13 
The counterclaim presented two issues. Initially, it had to be deter-
mined whether the plaintiff had been negligent in settling the defendant's 
claim. If negligence did exist, it then had to be determined whether the 
defendant would have recovered more than the settlement amount had 
he been represented properly. 14 In effect, there is "a trial within a trial" 
on this second issue because the jury has to determine the probable 
outcome of the underlying personal injury case. 15 
The principal issues on appeal, however, were evidentiary. The plaintiff 
claimed that the trial court erroneously admitted expert testimony from 
a lawyer experienced in tort law and an experienced claims adjuster. 
Both testified to the reasonable settlement value of the underlying claim. 16 
The plaintiff objected that this value was not a proper measurement of 
value. Disagreeing, the Court found the evidence relevant to prove not 
only the plaintiff's negligence, but also that his negligence caused a loss 
to his client. 17 
Finally, the Court indicated that the doctrine holding that a violation 
of statute constitutes evidence of negligence is applicable to violations 
10 /d. (citing McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 374, 377-78, 115 N.E.2d 481, 483 (1917); 
Caverly v. McOwen, 123 Mass. 574, 578 (1879); Varnum v. Martin, 15 Pick. (32 Mass.) 
440, 442 (1834); Glidded v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 598, 427 N.E.2d 1169, 1170 
(1981); Barry, Legal Malpractice in Massachusetts, 63 MAss. L. REV. 15, 17 (1978)). 
11fd. 
12 /d. (citing Edmondson v. Dressman, 469 So. 2d 571, 574 (Ala. 1985); Cook v. Connolly, 
366 N.W.2d 287, 292, (Minn. 1985); Rodriguez v. Horton, 95 N.M. 356, 359-60 (Ct. App. 
1980); Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 94, 117-18 (1985)). 
"!d. 
14 /d. at 647, 487 N.E.2d at 1380. 
15 /d. 
16 The attorney testified that the case normally would have settled for $450,000 to $500,000 
and the claims adjuster stated $400,000 to $450,000. /d. at 648, 487 N.E.2d at 1380. The 
jury's verdict was $525,000. /d. at 645-46, 487 N.E.2d at 1379. 
17 /d. at 648,487 N.E.2d at 1380 (citing Rodriguez, supra, note 9, at 30. See also, Williams 
v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Duncan v. Lord, 409 F. Supp. 687, 
693 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Warwick, Paul & Warwick v. Dotter, 190 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. App. 
1966)). 
17
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of the canon of ethics. 18 Although the violation of a discliplinary rule "is 
not itself an actionable breach of duty to a client," it may be some 
evidence of an attorney's negligence "if a [client] can demonstrate that 
[the] discliplinary rule was intended to protect one in his position."19 
Holding that expert testimony is not required in the application of this 
doctrine, the Court noted that it is no more appropriate in the case of a 
discliplinary code violation than it would be in the case of a violation of 
statute or regulation. 20 
§ 10.8. Negligence-Vicarious Liability-Automobiles-Consent Statute. 
During the Survey year the Supreme Judicial Court decided a case which 
may cause some confusion in future cases involving General Laws chap-
ter 231, section 85A, the automobile consent statute. Under that statute, 
evidence of registration of a motor vehicle is prima facie evidence of the 
registrant's right of control over the driver and, therefore, legal respon-
sibility for injuries caused by the operation of the motor vehicle. In Cheek 
v. Econo-Car Rental System of Boston, Inc., 1 the plaintiff was injured 
while a passenger in a car leased by the driver from the defendant rental 
car agency. The Municipal Court for the City of Boston found for the 
plaintiff but the Appellate Division remanded for "further findings." Upon 
receipt of the additional "findings," the Appellate Division vacated the 
prior judgment for the plaintiff and ordered a new trial. 2 At the second 
trial before a different judge, the defendant prevailed. Plaintiff's report 
was then dismissed by the Appellate Division and plaintiff appealed to 
the Supreme Judicial Court claiming the order for the second trial was 
in error. 
The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that, in ordering the retrial, the 
Appellate Division had held correctly that the defendant-lessor could be 
held liable only if there existed a master-servant relationship between it 
and the lessee-driver at the time of the accident. 3 The initial remand to 
the trial court was for the specific purpose of making such further fact 
findings. Because the further findings appeared to contradict earlier fact 
determinations that a bailment for hire, not an agency, existed,4 the 
18 Id. at 649, 487 N.E.2d at 1381. 
,. Id. 
20 ld. at 650, 487 N.E.2d at 1382 (citing Perry v. Medeiros, 369 Mass. 836, 842, 343 
N.E.2d 859, 863 (1976)). 
§ 10.8. 1 393 Mass. 660, 473 N.E.2d 659 (1985). 
2 /d. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. According to the Supreme Judicial Court, the Appellate Division's conclusion that 
the findings were contradictory was incorrect "because it was theoretically possible, a!-
18
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Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the Appellate Division had cor-
rectly ordered a new trial. 
At the outset, the Supreme Judicial Court explained that the automobile 
consent statute is only an evidentiary provision and accordingly does not 
change substantive tort law. 5 The statute only creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the registered owner of a motor vehicle has control over 
the driver.6 Where control exists as a matter of fact, the owner of the 
vehicle is liable for accidents caused by the negligent operation of the 
vehicle by the driver. 7 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the case was properly remanded 
in the first instance because the trial judge "had made no findings con-
cerning the defendant's right to control the operation of the vehicle or 
the purpose for which it was being operated .... "8 On remand, the first 
trial judge found the automobile was registered to the defendant. In her 
second "finding" (which was in reality a ruling) she concluded "[p]ursuant 
to Chapter 231, Section 85A," that "the fact of registration [is] prima 
facie evidence that an agency relationship existed between [the lessee] 
and the defendant."9 Her third "finding" was that "[t]his prima facie 
evidence was not controverted by the defendant at the trial of this mat-
ter. "10 The only evidence relating to this finding was testimony by the 
plaintiff, who was the sole trial witness, that she was a passenger in an 
automobile that the driver had rented from the defendant and that, at the 
time of the accident, they were returning from a nightclub early in the 
morning. 11 Considering the second and third findings together, the Su-
preme Judicial Court held that the trial judge was in error in concluding 
that, because the statutory presumption had not been "controverted by 
the defendant," a finding of agency was compelled by the consent stat-
ute:12 
That ruling-that a finding of agency was compelled-was erroneous. The 
prima facie evidence was controverted-i.e., it was opposed, contested, or 
disputed-by the evidence that the vehicle had been leased and was being 
used at the time of the accident to transport its occupants from a nightclub. 
though unlikely, because the [lessee] rented the vehicle from the defendant but was also 
using the vehicle at the time of the accident in furtherance of the defendant's business and 
under the defendant's right of control." /d. at 663, 473 N.E.2d at 661. 
5 /d. at 661, 473 N .E.2d at 660. 
6 /d. at 662, 473 N.E.2d at 661. 
7 /d. 
8 /d. at 661, 473 N .E.2d at 660. 
9Jd. 
10 /d. 
11 /d. at 661, 662, 473 N.E.2d at 660, 661. 
12 /d. at 663, 473 N.E.2d at 661. 
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The evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding either way on the agency 
question. 13 
Three justices expressed a strong dissent stating that the court was 
"simply wrong" in concluding that the trial judge considered a finding of 
agency "compelled."14 Noting that the trial judge "never said [her finding] 
was compelled," 15 the dissent argued that her statement that the prima 
facie evidence of control "was not controverted by the defendant" was 
accurate since the controverting evidence had been supplied by the plain-
tiff.16 Although the source of "controverting" evidence is immaterial, the 
dissent. reasoned that the trial judge was not compelled to believe it. "As 
a trier of fact she was free to accept or reject this testimony in much the 
same way as a jury would be free to accept or reject testimony. " 17 Ifthe 
trial judge had rejected the "controverting" testimony and the defendant 
had introduced no evidence to prove the nonexistence of the agency 
relationship, then, the dissent further argued, there was no evidence to 
overcome the presumption created by the consent statute. 18 As thus 
explained, the trial judge had properly interpreted and applied the statute. 
Concluding, the dissenters warned that the majority's opinion will "ev-
iscerate G.L. c. 231, § 85A, and, without trying to vaticinate, [we] believe 
this opinion may well return to haunt us. " 19 
§ 10.9. Negligence-Liability of General Contractor for Construction Site 
Injuries. In Corsetti v. The Stone Co., 1 the Supreme Judicial Court clar-
ified the law with respect to the liability of a general contractor for 
construction site injuries. The Court's opinion establishes the relevancy 
of rules and regulations promulgated by the state for the protection of 
workers on construction sites in defining the applicable standards for 
determining negligent conduct. 
The case involved a negligence action brought by a construction 
worker, an employee of a subcontractor, against the general contractor 
to recover for injuries sustained when he fell from a scaffolding on which 
he was working. 2 The plaintiff's specific complaint was that the general 
contractor was negligent in failing to require workers on the construction 
13 /d. 
14 ld. at 664, 473 N.E.2d at 661 (Nolan, J., dissenting). 
"!d. 
16fd. 
17 ld. at 664 473 N.E.2d at 662. See also, Nugent v. Classic Car Corp., 379 Mass. 913, 
393 N.E.2d 934 (1979); P. J. LIACOS, MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 50-5! (5th ed. 1981). 
18 ld. at 664-65, 473 N.E.2d at 662. 
19 ld. at 664, 473 N.E.2d at 662. 
§ 10.9. '396 Mass. I, 483 N.E.2d 793 (1985). 
'!d. at 3, 483 N.E.2d at 794. 
20
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project to use appropriate safety equipment3 as specified in rules and 
regulations issued by the state Department of Labor and Industries.4 
At the outset, the Court agreed that the general contractor, Stone, 
could not be vicariously liable for the negligence of the subcontractor, 
Salvucci, or its employees unless the relationship between Stone and 
Salvucci was that of master and servant.5 However, the Court held that, 
regardless of the precise relationship, Stone could become liable for its 
own negligence to Salvucci's employees. The Court expressly refused to 
limit Stone's potential liability to the general duty to provide Salvucci's 
employees with a reasonably safe worksite and to warn them of defects 
which Stone reasonably could have discovered on the worksite or in 
appliances already in place thereon.6 The Court noted that a general 
contractor can acquire other obligations. If, for example, the general 
contractor "retains the right to control the work [of the subcontractor] 
in any of its aspects, including the right to initiate and maintain safety 
measures and programs, he must exercise that control with reasonable 
care for the safety of others, and he is liable for damages caused by his 
failure to do so. "7 Liability of this genre, the Court reasoned, exists apart 
from the doctrine of respondeat superior or the principles of agency. It 
"usually, though not exclusively, [exists] when a principal contractor 
entrusts a part of the work to subcontractors, but [he] himself or through 
a foreman superintends the entire job."8 Whether the general contractor 
has sufficient control over part of the work of the subcontractor to render 
him liable on this theory is a question of fact for the jury.9 
3 /d. 
4 The plaintiff relied upon Industrial Bulletin No. 12, Rules and Regulations for the 
Prevention of Accidents in Construction Operations, Department of Labor and Industries, 
Division of Industrial Safety, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts. These regulations 
were formally promulgated on January I, 1978, 441 Code Mass. Regs. 10.00 et seq. The 
plaintiff also relied upon regulations of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration, specifically upon a booklet entitled "Construction Industry, OSHA Safety and 
Health Standards Digest, U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, (Revised) June 1975." /d. at 9, 483 N.E.2d at 797. However, the Court 
decided the case exclusively on the basis of the state regulations and accordingly did not 
determine the effect of the federal regulations. /d. at 13, 483 N.E.2d at 800. 
5 /d. at 9-10, 483 N.E.2d at 798 (citing Whalen v. Shivek, 326 Mass. 142, 149-50, 93 
N.E.2d 393 (1950); Herrick v. Springfield, 288 Mass. 212, 216, 192 N.E.2d 626 (1934)). The 
Court followed the Restatement position as set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 409, comment b, and§ 414. 
6 /d. at 9, 483 N.E.2d at 798. 
7 /d. at 10, 483 N.E.2d at 798 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,§ 414). 
8 /d. 
9 /d. at I, 483 N.E.2d at 798 (citing Hammond v. Bechtel Inc., 606 P.2d 1269, 1275 
(Alaska 1980); Rabar v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 415 A.2d 499, 507-08 (Del. Super. 
1980)). 
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In holding that the jury properly could have found that Stone owed 
Corsetti the duty of reasonable care for his safety, the Court relied upon 
both Stone's construction contracts and the on-site activities of its em-
ployees. Stone's contract with the owner of the premises placed on Stone 
the responsibility "to initiate, maintain, and supervise 'all safety precau-
tions and programs in connection with the Work."' 10 Under its subcon-
tract with the plaintiff's employer, Stone retained the authority and 
control necessary to carry out that responsibility. 11 These contractual 
provisions, by themselves, the Court ruled, could not "vary or heighten 
any duty Stone may have owed to the plaintiff," but they were "relevant 
as evidence of control over the safety aspects of the work. "12 Other 
provisions of the contracts specifying that Stone was to comply with 
federal and state safety regulations served to "provide[] evidence of the 
standards the parties considered to be material to due care under the 
circumstances. "13 More specifically, the jury could have found that 
Stone's supervisor at the job site had the authority to direct subcontrac-
tors to remedy violations of safety rules and regulations and to stop work 
if they failed to comply. 14 Stone's representative admitted making mini-
mal inspections and discussing safety requirements and procedures with 
the subcontractors. 15 He also knew that Salvucci's masons were not using 
safety belts while working on the scaffolding. 16 Thus, from both the 
contractual provisions and the on-site activity of Stone's employees, the 
jury could have found that Stone retained and exercised control over the 
safety of workers. 
On the issue whether Stone had been negligent in not requiring the use 
of safety belts by persons working on the scaffolding, Stone's defense 
was twofold: first, that safety belts were not required by industry cus-
tom;17 and, second, that the use of safety belts were not feasible. The 
first defense was found inconsistent with the safety regulations promul-
gated by the state 18 which were held to be controlling. 19 The second was 
10 /d. at II, 483 N.E.2d at 799. This language also appears in the model construction 
contract sponsored by the American Institute of Architects, entitled "Standard form of 
Agreement Between Owner and Contractor 1977 Edition," denominated AlA Document 
A 101, and "General Conditions of the Contract for Construction," denominated AlA Doc-
ument A20 l. Article lO of Stone's contract with the owner of the premises is identical with 
the AlA provisions. /d. at 6 n.4, 483 N.E.2d at 796 n.4. 
11 /d. at II, 483 N .E.2d at 799. 





17 There was evidence that safety lines and belts were used by masons but not under the 
conditions in which the plaintiff was working when he fell. /d. at 7, 483 N .E.2d at 797. 
18 See supra note 4. 
19 Corsetti, 396 Mass. at 13, 483 N.E.2d at 800. 
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disputed by expert testimony that the use of safety belts and lines were 
"feasible, practicable and dictated by good safety management. "20 This 
testimony, together with the circumstances of the plaintiff's fall, the 
Court observed, was sufficient to warrant a finding of negligence "totally 
apart from the regulations."21 
§ 10.10. Products Liability-Duty of Supplier of Component Parts to 
Warn of Dangers in Assembled Product. The question of the possible duty 
of a supplier of component parts to warn of dangers inherent in the use 
of another product of which his parts are components was presented to 
the Supreme Judicial Court for the first time in Mitchell v. Sky Climber, 
Inc. 1 The Court concluded that the duty of the component parts' supplier 
is limited to the duty to warn of dangers associated with the use of its 
own product and that there is no duty to warn the assembler or its 
customers of any dangers associated with the assembled product. 2 
The defendant, Sky Climber, had supplied a motor incorporated into 
a scaffold sold or leased by another defendant, Marr, to Brisk, the em-
ployer of plaintiff's decedent. 3 The plaintiff's decedent died as a result 
of an electric shock he sustained while attempting to repair the scaffolding 
equipment upon which he was working. 4 The plaintiff made no claim that 
Sky Climber's product was defective, nor did he allege any failure on 
the part of Sky Climber adequately to warn of dangers associated with 
the use of its motor. His only complaint was that "Sky Climber violated 
a duty to give instructions concerning the safe and proper rigging and 
use of the scaffolding. "5 
Although Sky Climber did not supply any part of the scaffold other 
than the motor, it did distribute manuals to customers containing safety, 
rigging, operating and maintenance information.6 Decedent's employer 
received them frequently and made them available to workers, including 
a field superintendent who used the information to advise foremen on 
the job.7 The Court assumed jury questions existed as to whether there 
was negligence (presumably on the part of Marr or Brisk) in the assem-
bling of the equipment or in the wiring of the scaffold. 8 However, it was 
not alleged that Sky Climber was responsible for any of this. There were 
no allegations that Sky Climber's manual contained any error that led to 
20 ld. 
21 Id. 
§ 10.10. 1 396 Mass. 629, 487 N.E.2d 1374 (1986). 
2 Id. at 631, 487 N.E.2d at 1376. 
3 Id. at 630, 487 N.E.2d at 1375. 
4 ld. 
5 Id. 
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improper rigging of the scaffold or to the use of defective equipment 
therein.9 Rather, the plaintiff argued that, because Sky Climber volun-
tarily distributed a manual, it owed an affirmative duty to warn against 
the defective assembling and wiring of the scaffold. In rejecting this 
argument, the Court stated there was "no duty on a manufacturer to set 
forth in customers' manuals a warning of a possible risk created solely 
by the act of another that would not be associated with a foreseeable use 
or misuse of the manufacturer's own product. "10 Summary judgment for 
Sky Climber, therefore, was appropriate. 
§ 10.11. Products Liability-Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Duty To 
Warn. In another duty to warn case, the Supreme Judicial Court placed 
a heavy duty upon manufacturers of oral contraceptives. In MacDonald 
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 1 the plaintiff and her husband brought 
suit against the defendant, Ortho, for injuries allegedly caused by Ortho's 
birth control pills. The jury found for the plaintiffs, but the trial court 
granted defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on 
the theory that Ortho did not owe a duty to warn consumers of dangers 
associated with prescription drugs. Transferring the case on its own 
motion, the Supreme Judicial Court reinstated the jury verdict. In doing 
so, the Court has gone farther than any other court in imposing a duty 
upon manufacturers of birth control pills to warn consumers directly of 
dangers inherent in the use of the pill. 2 
The plaintiff, a twenty-six year old woman, had obtained oral contra-
ceptives through a prescription issued by her doctor. As required by 
federal law, Ortho labeled the dispenser in which the pills were contained 
with a warning disclosing the drug's possible side effects. 3 Also pursuant 
to federal law, the plaintiff's doctor gave her a booklet, prepared and 
distributed by Ortho.4 This booklet contained detailed information about 
the contraceptive pill and its risks. 5 The label and booklet warned of the 
danger of brain damage caused by abnormal blood clotting, although the 
9 /d. at 631, 487 N.E.2d at 1376. 
10 /d. at 632, 487 N .E.2d at 1376. 
§ 10.11. 1 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65, cert. denied, 471 U.S., 106 S.Ct. 250, 88 
L.Ed.2d 258 (1985). 
2 /d. at 144, 475 N.E.2d at 73 (O'Connor, J., disse!}ting). 
3 /d. at 132, 475 N.E.2d at 66. 
4 Id. at 133, 475 N.E.2d at 67. 
5 /d. at 132-33, 475 N.E.2d at 67. 
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word "stroke" was not used. 6 After three years of using the drug, plaintiff 
suffered a stroke which left her permanently disabled. 7 
The jury returned a verdict finding no negligence or breach of warranty 
in the manufacture of the pills. 8 The jury also found that Ortho had 
adequately advised plaintiff's doctor of the risks. 9 However, it found 
Ortho had breached its warranty and was negligent in not providing 
sufficient warning to the plaintiff. 10 The jury reached this decision despite 
the admission of the plaintiff that she had read both the label on the 
contraceptive dispenser and the booklet given to her by her physician. 11 
In entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court ruled 
that, because oral contraceptives are prescription drugs, Ortho had ful-
filled its duty to warn consumers by providing adequate warnings to the 
prescribing physician. 12 In reversing, the Supreme Judicial Court recog-
nized that the trial court had applied the rule formulated for prescription 
drugs. But, the Court ruled, "[o]ral contraceptives ... bear peculiar 
characteristics which warrant the imposition of a common law duty on 
the manufacturer to warn users directly of associated risks. " 13 
The Court recognized that the rule it laid down departs from the 
prescription drug rule overwhelmingly recognized throughout the United 
States. With one possible exception, 14 the rule for prescription drugs is 
that "the prescribing physician acts as a 'learned intermediary' between 
the manufacturer and the patient" so that "the duty of the ethical drug 
manufacturer is to warn the doctor, rather than the patient, [although] 
the manufacturer is directly liable to the patient for a breach of such 
duty."15 In departing from this principle, the Court made it clear that its 
decision was limited to oral contraceptives because the pill "stands apart 
from other prescription drugs." 16 In the use of oral contraceptives, the 
consumer is "actively involved" in the decision to take the drug. 17 The 
6 /d. at 133-34, 475 N .E.2d at 67. The significance of the word "stroke" is discussed in 
§ 10.12, infra. 
7 MacDonald, 394 Mass. at 133-34, 475 N.E.2d at 67. 
8 /d. at 134, 475 N.E.2d at 68. 
9 /d. 
10 /d. at 134-35, 475 N .E.2d at 68. 
11 /d. at 134-35 n.7, 475 N.E.2d at 68 n.7. See in this regard infra§ 10.12. 
12 MacDonald, 394 Mass. at 135, 475 N.E.2d at 68. 
13 /d. at 136-37, 475 N.E.2d at 69-70. 
14 Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961, amended by order, 532 
F. Supp. 211 (D. Wis. 1981). 
15 /d. at 136, 475 N.E.2d at 69 (quoting McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 
375, 386-87, 528 P.2d 522, 529 (1974). 
16 /d. at 138, 475 N.E.2d at 70. 
17 Id. at 137, 475 N.E.2d at 69. 
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physician typically examines the patient once before prescribing the pill 
and only annually thereafter. 18 Thus, the patient "only seldom ha[s] the 
opportunity to explore her questions and concerns about the medication 
with the prescribing physician" 19 and she "cannot be expected to remem-
ber all of the details for a protracted period of time. "20 Because of the 
availability of alternatives, the feasibility of direct warnings to the con-
sumer and the substantial risk involved in taking the pill, the Court 
concluded that "the manufacturer cannot rely upon the medical profes-
sion to satisfy its common law duty to warn ... the ultimate user."21 
The Court underscored that its decision did not diminish the physician's 
own duty to give adequate warnings to the patient to enable her to make 
an informed choice whether to use the drug or not. 22 
Justice O'Connor dissented, stating that '"the prescription drug' rule, 
combined with the Harnish [informed consent] rule, most fairly and 
efficiently allocates among drug manufacturers, physicians, and drug 
users, the risks and responsibilities involved with the use of prescription 
pills."23 Justice O'Connor also expressed his belief that these rules "best 
insure that a prescription drug user will receive in the most efficient 
manner the information that she needs to make an informed decision as 
to whether to use the drug. "24 
The Court's attempt to distinguish oral contraceptives from other pre-
scription drugs is unpersuasive. Patients who take heart medicine or other 
drugs on a continuing basis to regulate essential bodily systems are in 
positions similiar to those who take oral contraceptives. These other 
patients need to be enlightened in the use of the drugs prescribed for 
them and in the recognition of possible harmful side effects. As a result 
of the Harnish informed consent rule, there is no longer any basis for 
assuming that these other patients are not actively involved in the deci-
sion to follow a prescribed course of treatment. Similarly, there is no 
reason to assume that these patients see physicians as often as they 
should or that the medical warnings associated with the drugs they use 
are any less complicated or more easily understood and remembered than 
in the case of oral contraceptives. Over time, the Court's attempt to 
distinguish oral contraceptives from other drugs may prove unsuccessful. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Judicial Court may find itself in the position 
18 /d. 
!9Jd. 
20 /d. (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 9002 (1970)). 
21 /d. at 138, 475 N.E.2d at 70. 
22 /d. at 139 n.13, 475 N.E.2d at 70, n.13 (citing Harnish v. Children's Hospital Medical 
Center, 387 Mass. 152, 155, 439 N.E.2d 240, 243). See supra§ 10.6. 
23 MacDonald, 394 Mass. at 145, 475 N.E.2d at 72. 
24 /d. at 145-46, 475 N.E.2d at 72. 
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where it will have to repudiate the prescription drug rule, if it wants to 
retain the MacDonald rule. 
§ 10.12. Products Liability-Adequacy of Pharmaceutical Manufactur-
er's Warning to Consumer. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 1 
gave the Supreme Judicial Court the opportunity not only to impose upon 
manufacturers of oral contraceptives a duty to warn consumers directly, 
but also to comment upon the adequacy of the warnings given. Before 
arriving at the question of the adequacy of the particular warnings given 
in MacDonald, however, it is first necessary to reconcile the jury findings 
that adequate warning was given to the plaintiff's physician but not to 
the plaintiff although she received the same warning as her physician. 
These findings are not necessarily inconsistent. 
Ortho, it will be recalled, complied with the FDA requirements both 
by placing a warning on the label of the dispenser in which the pills were 
delivered to consumers and by providing a booklet written in lay language 
which contained additional information and was distributed to users of 
the pill by prescribing physicians.2 Mrs. MacDonald admitted receiving 
and reading both of these warnings. Nevertheless, the jury found that 
Ortho failed to give adequate warning to Mrs. MacDonald, although it 
found that Ortho had given adequate warning to her gynecologist. 3 If the 
adequate warning given to the gynecologist were conveyed by him to his 
patients, as required by the informed consent doctrine,4 then it logically 
follows that Mrs. MacDonald would have received adequate warning. 
Under such circumstances, the fact that Ortho had not communicated 
with her directly (except through the pill dispenser) would have caused 
her no harm. However, this apparently was not the case. Her physician 
was not a party to the action and the jury did not have the benefit of his 
testimony. However, Mrs. MacDonald testified that her physician in-
formed her only of possible "bloating," and "had not advised her of the 
increased risk of stroke ... . "5 Accordingly, the jury's finding of ade-
quate disclosure to the physician but not to Mrs. MacDonald is internally 
consistent and supported by the testimony in the case. It is therefore 
proper to focus on the adequacy of Ortho' s label and booklet in providing 
appropriate warning to consumers. 
§ 10.12. 1 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65, cert. denied, 471 U.S. _, 106 S.Ct. 250, 88 
L.Ed.2d 258 (1985). 
2 See supra § 10.11. 
3 MacDonald, 394 Mass. at 134-35, 475 N.E.2d at 68. 
4 See Hamish v. Children's Hospital Medical Center, 387 Mass. 152, 155, 439 N.E.2d 
240, 243, discussed in § 10.6, supra, and in DONOVAN, TORTS, 1982 ANN. SURV. MASS. 
LAW§ 11.4, at 373. 
5 MacDonald, 394 Mass. at 134-35 n.7, 475 N.E.2d at 68 n.7. 
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Ortho first argued that its warnings were adequate because they corn-
plied with FDA requirements which Ortho further claimed "preernpt[ed] 
or define[d] the bounds of the common law duty to warn."6 The Court 
rejected this argument because the FDA had specifically noted that "the 
boundaries for civil tort liability for failure to warn are controlled by 
applicable state law. "7 Although the federal warning provisions are quite 
extensive, the Supreme Judicial Court refused to make the common law 
duty coextensive with the federal regulations. Instances might arise, 
reasoned the Court, "where a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that 
a manufacturer's compliance with FDA labeling requirements or guide-
lines did not adequately apprise oral contraceptive users of inherent 
risks. "8 This may have been the very situation presented. Even though 
Ortho may have complied with the FDA requirements, and physicians 
might have contemplated the possibility of strokes, the Court held that 
"the jury nontheless could have found that the lack of a reference to 
'stroke' breached Ortho's common law duty to warn" consurners.9 As 
the Court stated: "compliance with FDA requirements, though admissible 
to demonstrate lack of negligence, is not conclusive on this issue, just as 
violation of FDA requirements is evidence, but not conclusive evidence, 
of negligence. "10 
MacDonald declares a consumer warning adequate if it is '"compre-
hensible to the average user and ... convey[s] a fair indication of the 
nature and extent of the danger to the mind of a reasonably prudent 
person. "'11 Whether a warning is sufficient will "almost always" be a 
question for the jury because a jury will provide a better indication of 
what an average person understands. A warning, otherwise appropriate, 
may be found inadequate because of its tone, as contrasted with its 
content: 
The adequacy of such warnings is measured not only by what is stated, 
but also by the manner in which it is stated. A reasonable warning not only 
conveys a fair indication of the nature and dangers involved, but also warns 
with the degree of intensity demanded by the nature of the risk. A warning 
6 /d. at 139, 475 N.E.2d at 70. 
7 !d. (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 4214 (1978)). 
8 /d. (citing Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1981); 
Skill v. Martinez, 91 F.R.D. 498, 508 (D.N.J. 1981); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 
3d 51, 65, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 53, 507 P.2d 653, 661 (1973); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical 
Corp., 270 Or. 375, 397-98, 528 P.2d 522, 533-34 (1974)). See generally, lA FRUMER & 
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY,§ 8.07[1) (1983). 
9 MacDonald, 394 Mass. at 140, 475 N.E.2d at 71. 
10 /d. 
11 !d. (quoting Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 180 Ind. App. 33, 49 (1979), 
quoting Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 85 (4th Cir. 1962)). 
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may be found to be unreasonable in that it was unduly delayed, reluctant 
in tone or lacking in a sense of urgency. 12 
Based upon the testimony given and the jury's common experience, the 
Court held that the jury was free to conclude that the failure to use the 
word "stroke" "unduly minimized the warning's impact or failed to make 
the nature of the risk reasonably comprehensible to the average con-
sumer. "13 According to the Court, "the jury may have concluded that 
there are fates worse than death, such as the permanent disablement 
suffered by MacDonald, and that the mention of the risk of death did 
not, therefore, suffice to apprise an average consumer of the material 
risks of oral contraceptive use. "14 
The Court also rejected Ortho' s contention that the plaintiff had failed 
to establish that her injuries were proximately caused by any inadequacy 
in the warning given. Specifically, Ortho argued that a reasonably prudent 
person, having been informed, as was Mrs. MacDonald, of the risk of 
death by abnormal blood clotting and having chosen to assume that risk, 
would not have acted differently if informed of the risk of "stroke. "15 
Rejecting this argument, the Court held that the jury was free to credit 
Mrs. MacDonald's testimony that she would not have taken the pill had 
she been warned of the risk of "stroke."16 The fact that she did not ask 
her doctor for an explanation of the warnings concerning "abnormal blood 
clotting" and "death" suggested comparative negligence on her part, but 
it did not prevent the jury from finding a causal connection between her 
injuries and the failure of Ortho to warn her of a possible stroke. How-
ever, because this issue was not raised below, the Court did not entertain 
it on appeal. 17 
§ 10.13. Defamation-Constitutional Principles- Statements Not of Pub-
lic Concern. During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court 
had further occasion to define the limits of Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 1 
in which the Court held that the first amendment prohibited tort awards 
of presumed and exemplary damages against publishers for false and 
defamatory statements unless the plaintiff proved "actual malice," that 
12 /d. at 141, 475 N.E.2d at 71 (quoting Seley v. G. D. Searle Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 
198, 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1981)). 
13 /d. at 141, 475 N.E.2d at 71-72. 
14fd. 
15 /d. at 142, 475 N.E.2d at 72. 
16fd. 
17 /d. 
§ 10.13. I 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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is, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. 2 This year, in 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 3 the Supreme Court 
held that plaintiffs could recover presumed and punitive damages absent 
a showing of"actual malice" without violating the First Amendment when 
the defamatory statements did not involve matters of public concern. 
This decision has already become significant in Massachusetts due to the 
several defamation cases decided during this Survey year. 
In Dun & Bradstreet, the petitioner, a credit reporting agency, sent a 
report to its subscribers stating that the respondent construction con-
tractor had filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy.4 The report was 
found to be false and a gross misrepresentation. A Dun & Bradstreet (D 
& B) employee had made an error in reviewing bankruptcy proceedings 
and D & B failed to follow its own procedure of verifying the informa-
tion. 5 The contractor was awarded $50,000 in compensatory or presumed 
damages and $300,000 in punitive damages.6 The Vermont Supreme Court 
reversed a lower court's grant of a new trial because it concluded that 
Gertz was not meant to apply to "non-media" speakers and private figure 
plaintiffs. 7 The United States Supreme Court affirmed, but for different 
reasons. In essence, the Court held that the New York Times-Gertz 
standard does not apply to speech on matters of purely private concern. 
In deciding whether the statements were about public or private mat-
ters, the Court applied the Gertz balancing test. In Gertz, the Court had 
determined that the constitutional interest in preserving "uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open debate" "on public issues"8 was greater in the 
case of public, as compared with private, figures. 9 The Court struck this 
balancing of constitutional interests in protecting speech and the state's 
interests in protecting its private citizens from defamatory injury to rep-
utation in the context of "expression on a matter of undoubted public 
concern. " 10 Gertz did not indicate, however, how the balance would be 
struck where the defamatory statements were not matters of public con-
cern. This issue was addressed in Dun & Bradstreet. 11 
2 In effect, Gertz simply extended the test formulated for public figures in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), to persons who are limited public figures. 
3 472 U.S. 749, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985). 
4 /d. at 751, 105 S.Ct. at 2941, 86 L.Ed.2d at 595. 
s /d. 
6 /d. at 752, 105 S.Ct. at 2942, 86 L.Ed.2d at 596. 
7 /d. 
"ld. at 754, 105 S.Ct. at 2943, 86 L.Ed.2d at 597 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 u.s. 254, 270 (1964)). 
• /d. at 756, 105 S.Ct. at 2944, 86 L.Ed.2d at 598. 
10 /d. at 758, 105 S.Ct. at 2945, 86 L.Ed.2d at 599. 
11 The nature of speech as involving matters of public or private concern is determined 
by its content, form and context. /d. at 761, 105 S.Ct. at 2947, 86 L.Ed.2d at 601. These 
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After first noting that "speech on matters of purely private concern is 
of less First Amendment concem,"12 the Dun & Bradstreet Court then 
noted it "is not totally unprotected" 13 and ultimately concluded that the 
constitutional protection of such speech is "less stringent. "14 Because of 
the "reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public 
concem,"15 the Court held that the state could award presumed and 
punitive damages "absent a showing of actual malice. "16 
§ 10.14. Defamation-Constitutional Principles-Determination of a 
Public Figure. In Materia v. Huff, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court held that 
Massachusetts would follow the rule accepted by many jurisdictions that 
officials of unions qualify as "public figures" for the purpose of union 
elections and other union business.2 In Materia, a defeated incumbent 
union official obtained $15,000 in compensatory damages for injuries 
sustained because of a defamatory letter circulated by his opponents 
prior to a union election. Because the trial judge did not instruct the jury 
that the plaintiff was a limited public figure, as a matter of law, the 
Supreme Judicial Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. 3 
Ordinarily, the question whether the plaintiff is a public figure is for 
the jury.4 Where however, the facts bearing upon this question are "un-
contested or agreed by the parties," it becomes the responsibility of the 
trial judge to determine as a matter of law the plaintiff's status as a public 
official or a private figure. 5 This determination is important because it 
affects the standard of liability which the states constitutionally may 
considerations led the Court to conclude that the credit report involved only private speech. 
The Dun & Bradstreet report had been disseminated to a limited number of persons 
composed of "only five subscribers, who, under the terms of the subscription agreement, 
could not disseminate it further," and therefore obviously did not involve "any strong 
interest in the free flow of commercial information." /d. "It was speech solely in the 
individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience," id., and was "solely 
motivated by the desire for profit .... " /d. Moreover, the information was objectively 
verifiable and the market provided a powerful incentive for accuracy since false credit 
reporting is of no use to creditors. "Thus, any incremental 'chilling' effect of libel suits 
would be of decreased significance." /d. 





§ 10.14. 1 394 Mass. 328, 475 N.E.2d 1212 (1985). 
2 /d. at 331, 475 N.E.2d at 1215. 
3 /d. at 328, 475 N.E.2d at 1213. 
4 /d. at 330, 475 N.E.2d at 1214. 
5 /d. (citing Rosenblatt v. Bear, 383 U.S. 75 (1966)(public official); and Wolston v. 
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 165-169 (1979)(public figure)). 
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adopt as part of their substantive law of defamation. Where the plaintiff 
is a public official or a public figure, the Constitution preempts a standard 
other than "actual malice," that is, "knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth. "6 However, the states are free to determine for 
themselves appropriate standards for determining the liability of publish-
ers and broadcasters of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private per-
son "so long as they do not impose liability without fault. "7 
§ 10.15. Defamation-Constitutional Principles-- Labor Disputes--Bur-
den of Proof-Damages--Interest. The Supreme Judicial Court deter-
mined the interaction of federal and state law concerning libel occurring 
in a labor law context in Tosti v. Ayik (Tosti Il). 1 The defendant Ayik, 
the author of an alleged libelous article, and the union which published 
it, both appealed from the retrial verdicts awarding the plaintiff $5,000 
in damages against Ayik and $495,000 against the union.2 The article 
accused the plaintiff, a foreman at a General Motors plant, of punching 
vehicle repair tickets when the repair work had not been performed.3 As 
a management employee, the plaintiff should not have been punching 
tickets, a matter that was reserved for union employees under the col-
lective bargaining agreement.4 After publication of the article, General 
Motors discharged the plaintiff allegedly for punching the vehicle repair 
tickets of unrepaired vehicles. 5 As a result, the plaintiff sued and recov-
ered verdicts against Ayik and the union for interference with an em-
ployment relationship as well as for libel. These verdicts were set aside 
on appeal. 6 On remand, the jury returned verdicts for both defendants 
on the tortious interference counts and for plaintiff against both defen-
dants on the libel counts. On the second appeal of the defendants, the 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the libel judgments but found the award 
against the union excessive. Accordingly, it remanded the case for re-
mittitur in an amount determined by the trial judge or for a new trial 
should the plaintiff refuse to accept remittitur. 7 
The Supreme Judicial Court first had to decide whether state libel law 
could be applied to defamation occurring in a labor context or whether 
it was preempted by overriding federal labor policy. On the previous 
6 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 u.s. 254, 279 (1964)). 
7 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. 
§ 10.15. 1 394 Mass. 482, 476 N.E.2d 928 (1985). 
2 /d. at 485, 476 N.E.2d at 931. 
3 /d. at 484, 476 N.E.2d at 931. 
4 /d. 
5 /d. 
6 Tosti v. Ayik, 386 Mass. 721, 437 N.E.2d 1062 (1982) (Tosti 1). 
7 Tosti II, 394 Mass. at 501, 476 N .E.2d at 940. 
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appeal, the Court had concluded that "[t]ederallabor law preempts [s]tate 
libel law to the extent that defamatory statements made in the context 
of a labor dispute are [not] actionable [unless] made with knowledge of 
their falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth. "8 Subsequent to Tosti 
I, however, the United States Supreme Court decided Local 926, Int'l 
Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 9 holding that a claim of tortious 
interference with an employment relationship was preempted because it 
"was not 'so deeply rooted in local law' as to outweigh 'the interference 
with federal labor law that prosecution of the state action would entail. '" 10 
Nevertheless, Tosti II found no preemption. Instead, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court read Local 926 as reaffirming an earlier decision of the United 
States Supreme Court that held '"an action for malicious and injurious 
libel in the course of a labor dispute ... was not pre-empted ... since 
remedying injury to reputation was only of slight concern to the national 
labor policy and was a matter deeply rooted in state law. "'11 
The Supreme Judicial Court next decided that the plaintiff did not have 
to prove the responsibility of the union for the action of its subordinates 
by clear and convincing evidence, 12 but it did have to meet this standard13 
in its proof of actual malice. 14 "In defamation cases governed by the 
standard of New York Times v. Sullivan," 15 stated the Court, "we are 
under a constitutional obligation to determine 'whether the jury would 
be warranted in concluding that malice was proved by clear and con-
vincing evidence. "'16 This standard may not be as difficult as it might 
first appear. As the Court "reiterate[d] ... [a)ctual malice is not neces-
sarily proved in terms of ill will or hatred, but is proved rather by a 
8 Tosti/, 386 Mass. at 723, 437 N.E.2d at 1064 (citing Nat'! Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. 
Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273 (1974); Linn v. Plant Guard Worker Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61 
(1966)). 
9 460 u.s. 669 (1983). 
10 /d. at 681. 
11 Tosti II, 394 Mass. at 486, 476 N .E.2d at 932 (citing Local 926, 460 U.S. at 681 n.ll, 
quoting Linn, 383 U.S. at 64). 
12 In making the ruling, the Court had to confine the applicability of G.L. c. 149, § 208 
to "actions arising from violent labor disputes, such as injunction and contempt proceed-
ings." Tosti II, 394 Mass. at 487, 476 N.E.2d at 933. 
13 The Court defined "[c]lear and convincing proof [as] involv[ing] a degree of belief 
greater than the usually imposed burden of proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence, 
but less than the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt imposed in criminal cases." 
The evidence must be sufficient to convey to a "high degree of probability" that the 
defendant acted with substantial doubts about the truth of the statement. Tosti II, 394 
Mass. at 493, 476 N.E.2d at 936 (citations omitted). 
14 Tosti II, 394 Mass. at 491, 476 N.E.2d at 935. 
15 376 u.s. 254, 270 (1964). 
16 Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 870, 330 N.E.2d 161, 177 
(1975). 
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showing that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge 
that it was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false. "17 "The 
test is entirely a subjective one," 18 but it can be satisfied by objective 
evidence as Tosti II itself demonstrates. 
The Court relied upon several objective factors in deciding that there 
was evidence sufficient to provide clear and convincing proof of Ayik's 
malice. In the first place, Ayik testified that he was not motivated in 
writing the story by plaintiff's alleged failure to repair the vehicles in-
volved. Rather, his concern was that plaintiff was engaged in an activity 
reserved for union workers under the collective bargaining agreement. 19 
Because of this motivation, the jury could have inferred that Ayik "either 
fabricated the other charges or ... [made] his accusations based on 
suspicions and not facts."20 There was evidence that this was the case. 
The defendant had testified that on June 7, the date in question, his own 
work in "chasing stock" kept him away from the area where he and 
plaintiff were stationed "for substantial periods of time, including the 
fifteen minute period [immediately] prior to making the observations 
alleged in his article. "21 Ayik also conceded that he did not know how to 
read the tickets and therefore had no idea what repairs were actually 
designated on the tickets, nor whether any of the cars whose tickets were 
punched by plaintiff had improper repairs or safety problems.22 Finally, 
Ayik admitted that his allegations that plaintiff had punched the tickets 
of unrepaired vehicles on June 7 was based solely on his observations of 
plaintiff allegedly doing the same thing during the months of April and 
May. 23 Plaintiff contradicted these allegations, testifying that Ayik could 
not have made the observations alleged because plaintiff had not worked 
the night shift as did Ayik during April and May. This testimony, "if 
believed by the jury," the Court held, "was sufficient to provide clear 
and convincing proof that Ayik either published his article based on 
fabricated observations of the plaintiff or, at the least, entertained serious 
doubts as to the truths of his allegations. "24 
The Supreme Judicial Court's remaining observations of its constitu-
tional role in reviewing libel actions centered on the excessive damage 
17 Tosti II, 394 Mass. at 491, 476 N.E.2d at 935 (quoting Stone, 367 Mass. at 867, 330 
N.E.2d at 175). 
18 /d. 
19 Jd. at 493, 476 N.E.2d at 936. 
20 ld. 
21 Jd. at 492, 476 N.E.2d at 935. 
22Jd. 
23 /d. at 493, 476 N.E.2d at 936. 
24Jd. 
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award against the union. In ordinary defamation cases, the Court ob-
served, judges have "a special duty of vigilance in charging juries and 
[in] reviewing verdicts to see that damages are no more than compen-
satory," both "[b]ecause of constitutional considerations, and the poten-
tial difficulties in assessing fair compensation. "25 A defamed plaintiff is 
"entitled only to fair compensation for his actual damages, including his 
mental suffering and harm to his reputation, and for any special damage 
he has suffered which have been pleaded and proved. "26 The duty to 
exercise special vigilance is even greater in reviewing defamation occur-
ing in a labor context. Here, the Court reasoned, "heightened scrutiny" 
is required because "the propensity of juries to award excessive damages 
for defamation ... may pose a threat to the stability of labor unions. "27 
Although the Court surmised that the jury believed that the union 
"caused the plaintiff's discharge by the libelous publication," it was not 
convinced that the evidence presented was sufficient to support this 
conclusion. Although "[t]here was evidence that the plaintiff and his 
family suffered financial hardship in the years after his discharge, "28 the 
Court could find no proof in the record that "the plaintiff's failure to 
obtain full-time employment [during these years] was due to the defen-
dant's tortious acts."29 In particular, there was no proof that potential 
employers were aware of the libelous article, let alone that they would 
not hire plaintiff because of the defamation. 30 
Finally, the Court upheld the trial court in awarding interest on the 
jury verdict at the rate of twelve percent per annum from June 13, 1973, 
the date of the commencement of the action, until March 23, 1983, when 
judgment was entered. In assessing interest at twelve percent, the trial 
judge retroactively applied the 1982 amendment to General Laws chapter 
231, section 6B, which was expressly made applicable "to all actions in 
which damages are assessed on or after the effective date of this act" 
which occurred during July, 1982. 31 
§ 10.16. Defamation-Media-Negligence. Following the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc. 1 the 
Supreme Judicial Court resolved the conflict between the first amendment 
25 Id. at 495, 476 N.E.2d at 937 (quoting Stone, 367 Mass. at 861, 330 N.E.2d at 170). 
26 Id. at 4%, 476 N.E.2d at 938. 
21 Id. (citing Linn, 383 U.S. 53 at 64). 
28 Id. at 497, 476 N.E.2d at 939. 
29 Id. at 498, 476 N.E.2d at 939. 
30 ld. 
31 Acts of 1982, § 4. 
§ 10.16. 1 418 U.S. 323 (1974), discussed supra § 10.13. 
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and the law of defamation by holding, in Stone v. Essex County News-
papers, Inc., 2 that "private persons may recover compensation upon 
proof of negligent publication of a defamatory falsehood."3 During the 
Survey year, the Court refined its Stone holding by ruling in Appleby v. 
Daily Hampshire Gazette,4 that "reasonable reliance upon the accuracy 
of stories obtained fro111 a reputable wire service does not give rise to a 
triable issue of negligence. "5 
The Appleby plaintiff, convicted for assault and battery, homosexual 
rape and kidnapping, commenced ninety-four separate actions against 
various newspapers, radio and television stations for allegedly false and 
defamatory statements made about him during the criminal investigation.6 
The lower court entered summary judgment on behalf of the newspapers 7 
because the allegedly false statements had been republished verbatim 
from reports of reputable wire services.8 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court first noted that, under generally 
recognized tort principles, the republisher of a defamatory statement is 
subject to liability as if he were the original publisher. 9 Thus, using the 
negligence standard of Stone, the speaker is required to act "reasonably 
in checking on the truth or falsity . . . of the communication before 
publishing it. "10 In departing from this duty in the context of the case 
before it and in holding that the republication of wire service stories 
without verification is not negligent as a matter of law, the Court empha-
sized the industry acceptance of the wire services as accurate sources of 
information. 11 In fact, wire service stories were routinely republished 
without independent corroboration. 12 More importantly, the Court was 
influenced by the fear that required verification of wire services stories 
would place too heavy a burden upon the media. According to the Court, 
'"[n]o newspaper could ... assume in advance the burden of specially 
2 367 Mass. 849, 330 N .E.2d 161 (1975). 
3 /d. at 855, 330 N.E.2d at 166 (emphasis in original). 
4 395 Mass. 32, 478 N .E.2d 721 (1985). 
5 /d. at 34, 478 N.E.2d at 722. 
6 /d. 
7 /d. The trial judge entered final summary judgments for the newspapers in four cases 
which he deemed representative of the twenty-nine other cases pending before him. In 
order to avoid unnecessary costs and delays, he directed the clerk-magistrate not to enter 
summary judgment in the remaining cases until an appellate court affirmed the action in 
the four decided cases. /d. at 35, 478 N.E.2d at 723. 
8 /d. at 35, 478 N.E.2d at 723. 
9 /d. (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, SECOND, § 580B, comment g (1977)). 
10 /d. 
11 /d. at 37, 478 N.E.2d at 725. 
12 /d. 
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verifying every item of news reported to it by established news gathering 
agencies, while at the same time publishing timely stories of worldwide 
or national interest. "' 13 Aside from these practical burdens, the Court 
reasoned, the imposition of a duty of verification would impinge upon 
society's first amendment interest in having news media free from "ap-
prehensive self-censorship. " 14 
For the same reasons, the Court also disagreed with the plaintiff's 
contention that a newspaper acts negligently when it fails to verify the 
accuracy of a story if independent verification is feasible. 15 Even though 
the stories may originate in an area of proximity to a particular news-
paper, "it would impose an impermissible burden on the dissemination 
of news if the media, and the courts, were forced to make subtle distinc-
tions between verifiable and nonverifiable wire stories."16 
Of the approximately forty-eight articles published about the Appleby 
plaintiff, forty-four were verbatim republications of the wire service dis-
patches. Having concluded that a finding of negligence cannot be predi-
cated upon the verbatim republication of a reputable wire service story, 
the Court ruled that summary judgment was appropriate in each of these 
cases. 17 The Court then concluded that four additional articles written by 
staff members of the newspapers were entitled to the same protection 
and summary disposition to the extent that they were accurate restate-
ments of the wire service dispatches. 18 The Court stated that "[a]s far as 
a newspaper's negligence with respect to the truth of a statement is 
concerned, there is no difference between reprinting a wire service story 
verbatim, and accurately restating its contents. " 19 
Finally, the Court was careful to limit its holding to wire service stories 
that appear proper on their face. Protection would not attach to stories 
that are "so inherently improbable or inconsistent that the [republishers] 
had, or should have had, some reason to doubt their accuracy. "20 The 
Court also stressed that a triable issue might result where the plaintiff 
can show that the republishers "knew, or should have known, of certain 
facts extraneous to the wire service stories which would have raised 
doubts as to the stories' veracity. "21 
13 /d. (citing Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 188, 146 So. 234, 239 (1933)). 
14 /d. at 38, 478 N.E.2d at 726. 
15 /d. 
16 /d. 
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§ 10.17. Defamation-Determination Whether Statements Concern 
Plaintiff. This Survey year also provided the Supreme Judicial Court with 
the chance to update the common law regarding the test to be employed 
in determining whether defamatory statements concern a particular per-
son. New England Tra.ctor Trailer Training of Connecticut, Inc. v. Globe 
Newspaper Co., 1 raised the question whether a series of newspaper 
articles defamed the separately incorporated Massachusetts and Con-
necticut branches of a private vocational training school. The Massachu-
setts corporation (NETTT-Mass) stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice, 
but the Connecticut corporation (NETTT -Conn) proceeded with its 
claim.2 Relying upon Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 3 the newspaper 
moved for summary judgment on the ground that it did not defame the 
Connecticut school because its highly critical references to the "New 
England Tractor-Trailer School," "New England" and "N. E. Tractor" 
were intended to apply only to the Massachusetts school.4 The person 
who served as president of both schools, however, countered with an 
affidavit claiming that although NETTT-Mass and NETTT-Conn were 
separately incorporated schools, they held themselves out to the public 
as but a single entity with two locations.5 In reversing summary judgment 
for the newspaper, the Appeals Court ruled that there existed a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether the statements were of and concerning 
the plaintiff.6 The newspaper's application for further appellate review 
was thereafter granted. 7 
In affirming, the Supreme Judicial Court brought Hanson in line with 
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in New York 
Times v. Sullivan8 and Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc. 9 Hanson stood for 
the fundamental principle that a plaintiff must "allege and prove that the 
words were spoken or written of or concerning the plaintiff. " 10 In making 
this determination, Hanson adopted a subjective test, pursuant to which 
the central inquiry was to determine "[t]he defendant's meaning in regard 
both to the person to whom the words should be applied and the impu-
tations against him .... "11 The subjective nature of this test is no more 
clearly demonstrated than by the facts of Hanson itself. 
§ 10.17. 1 395 Mass. 471, 480 N.E.2d 1005 (1985) [hereinafter NETTT]. 
'ld. at 472, 480 N.E.2d at 1006. 
3 159 Mass. 293, 34 N .E. 462 (1893). 
4 NETTT, 395 Mass. at 473, 480 N.E.2d at 1007. 
5 /d. 
6Jd. 
7 /d. at 472, 480 N.E.2d at 1006. 
8 376 U.S. 254 (1964), discussed supra§ 10.13. 
9 418 U.S. 323 (1974), discussed supra§ 10.13. 
10 Hanson, !59 Mass. at 294, 34 N .E. at 462. 
11 /d. at 294-95, 34 N.E. at 462. 
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In Hanson, the defendant published an article about "H. P. Hanson, a 
real estate and insurance broker of South Boston. "12 The newspaper 
intended the article to describe one "A. P. H. Hanson" who had been 
convicted of a crime. However, another real estate and insurance broker 
from South Boston whose name was "H. P. Hanson," sued for libel 
because the allegations were untrue as applied to him. Based upon a 
factual finding that "the alleged libel declared on by the plaintiff was not 
published by the defendant of or concerning the plaintiff,"13 the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that a judgment for the defendant was proper. 
In NETTT, 14 the Supreme Judicial Court decided to review Hanson for 
two reasons: (1) The nearly century-old Hanson decision "represent[ed] 
an historic view of tort law largely rejected by later cases" and "fail[ed] 
to accommodate the profound changes in defamation law" brought about 
by developing principles of constitutionallaw;1s (2) Hanson was decided 
before the negligent defamation standard was articulated in the wake of 
Sullivan and Gertz. Consideration of these changes led the Court to 
conclude that: 
a purely subjective test for determining whether a defendant's words are 
of and concerning the plaintiff represents an outmoded historic conception 
of tort law .... Tort law generally deems those injured by a person's 
unintentional slips deserving of compensation if the slips could have been 
avoided through the use of ordinary care. 16 
Adhering to the subjective test of Hanson, the Court reasoned, would 
"unduly narrow the potential for liability in defamation cases and [would] 
leave[] deserving plaintiffs uncompensated."17 Instead, the Court be-
lieved that liability should exist whenever defamatory statements, negli-
gently made, "reasonably could be interpreted to refer to the plaintiff. "18 
This is all that is meant by the requirement that the defamation be "of 
and concerning the plaintiff. " 19 As provided in the Restatement of Torts, 
Second, § 564: "A defamatory communication is made concerning the 
person to whom its recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, 
understands that it was intended to refer. "20 In summation, the Court 
concluded that: 
[A] defamation plaintiff must prove that the defendant's words are of and 
concerning the plaintiff. To do so, the plaintiff must prove either that the 
defendant intended its words to refer to the plaintiff and that they were so 
12 /d. at 294, 34 N.E. at 462. 
13 /d. at 299, 34 N.E. at 464. 






20 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, SECOND, § 64 at 165 (1977). 
39
Donovan: Chapter 10: Torts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1985
330 1985 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 10.19 
understood, or that the defendant's words reasonably could be interpreted 
to refer to the plaintiff and that the defendant was negligent in publishing 
them in such a way that they could be so understood. 21 
In the earlier discussed Appleby case, the Supreme Judicial Court 
stated that summary judgment generally is not useful in negligence cases. 
The Court explained: "[B]ecause of the jury's 'unique competence in 
applying the reasonable man standard,'" "summary judgment is rarely 
appropriate with respect to the merits of a negligence case. "22 However, 
this is not the view in defamation cases. In NETTT, the Supreme Judicial 
Court clearly stated that it favors the use of summary judgment proce-
dures in defamation cases. 23 Summary judgment was improper in this 
case, however, because the affidavit of the president of the two branches 
was sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of fact both as to the question 
whether the defendant newspaper was negligent and the question whether 
the defamation reasonably could be interpreted as referring to the Con-
necticut school. 
§ 10.18. Damages-Collateral Source Income. The aspect of the decision 
of the Supreme Judicial Court in Corsetti v. The Stone Co., 1 that has had 
the most immediate impact upon tort law in Massachusetts relates to the 
collateral source income rule. Unfortunately, this portion of the Court's 
opinion has been widely misinterpreted as making evidence of collateral 
source income automatically admissible in any case where the defense 
of malingering on the part of the plaintiff is raised. This is not the holding 
of the Court. Only a very minor change has been made in the collateral 
source income rule. Such evidence generally remains inadmissible. For 
an analysis of this aspect of the Corsetti case, see Comment, supra p. 1. 
§ 10.19. Damages-Contribution. The Supreme Judicial Court had two 
occasions during this Survey year to consider the question whether dam-
ages should be apportioned among joint tortfeasors on the basis of com-
parative fault. On both occasions, the Court answered no. In the first 
case, Zeller v. Cantu, 1 the Court adhered to its earlier pronouncements2 
21 NETIT, 395 Mass. at 483, 480 N.E.2d at 1012. 
22 Appleby, 395 Mass. 32, 36, 478 N.E.2d 721, 724 (1985) (quoting Foley v. Matulewicz, 
17 Mass. App. 1004, 1005, 459 N.E.2d 1262, 1263 (1984), quoting lOA C.A. WRIGHT, A.R. 
MILLER & M.K. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2729, at 194 (1983)). 
23 NETIT, 395 Mass. at 480, 480 N.E.2d at 1011 (citing Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 
8 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 74, 391 N.E.2d 935, 937 (1979), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 
444 u.s. 1060 (1980)). 
§ 10.18. 1 396 Mass. I, 483 N.E.2d 793 (1985), discussed supra§ 10.9. 
§ 10.19 1 395 Mass. 76, 478 N.E.2d 930 (1985). 
2 Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 350, 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1039 
(1983); Graci v. Damon, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 160, 170, 374 N.E.2d 311, 319, aff'd 376 Mass. 
931, 383 N.E.2d 842 (1978). 
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and held that contribution among joint tortfeasors must be apportioned 
under the contribution statute3 on a pro rata basis rather than under the 
comparative negligence statute4 on relative degrees of fault. In the second 
case, Rathbun v. Western Massachusetts Electric Co.,' the Court refused 
to order one equally negligent defendant to indemnify another, but sug-
gested that the Legislature consider amending the contribution statute to 
apportion contribution on the basis of comparative fault. 
In the primary action in Zeller, the plaintiff had been awarded 
$1 ,287,466 in damages for injuries suffered during an operation performed 
by one defendant, Dr. Cantu, using surgical blades manufactured by 
another defendant, the American Safety Razor Corporation (ASRC). The 
blades broke and became permanently lodged in the plaintiff's back.6 
Cantu paid the plaintiff only $100,000, the limit of his insurance coverage; 
ASRC paid the balance. Cantu was then ordered to pay ASRC an addi-
tional $548,516.057 as contribution under General Laws chapter 231B, 
section 3(b). 
On appeal, Cantu claimed that the trial judge erred in not awarding 
contribution on the basis of his comparative fault, asserting: (1) the 
enactment of the comparative negligence statute impliedly repealed or 
modified the earlier enacted contribution statute; (2) the contribution 
statute's reference to "equity" in chapter 231B, 2(c) required apportion-
ment of damages based upon fault; and (3) the failure to consider relative 
fault violated both the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
state and federal constitutions.8 
In rejecting the implicit repeal argument, the Supreme Judicial Court 
first noted that section 2(a) of the contribution statute expressly states 
that "[i]n determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors . . . their relative 
degrees of fault shall not be considered."9 Thus, the contribution statute 
expressly covered the situation before the Court. Second, the compara-
tive negligence statute contained no provisions specifying a method for 
determining contribution awards and, therefore, did not conflict with the 
contribution statute. By its express language, the comparative negligence 
statute showed its only purpose was to "ameliorate the harsh results" of 
the contributory negligence doctrine. 10 Because the two statutes did not 
3 G.L. c. 231B (1984 ed.). 
4 G.L. c. 231, § 85 (1984 ed.). 
'395 Mass. 361, 479 N.E.2d 1383 (1985), discussed infra§ 10.20. 
6 Zeller, 395 Mass. at 77, 478 N.E.2d at 931. 
7 This figure represents one-half of the amount paid by ASRC plus interest, minus the 
payment made by Cantu to the plaintiff. 
8 Zeller, 395 Mass. at 77-78, 478 N.E.2d at 931. 
• Id. at 78, 478 N.E.2d at 931. 
10 Id. at 79, 478 N.E.2d at 931-32. 
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conflict, the Court concluded that there was "no reason to apply the 
exceptional doctrine of implied repeal." 11 The Court also noted that other 
jurisdictions which, like Massachusetts, had enacted the Uniform Con-
tribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, were "unwilling to presume solely 
on the basis of the subsequent adoption of comparative negligence, an 
intent to repeal the Uniform Act's pro rata method of allocating liabil-
ity."12 The Court was not unmindful of the possible unfairness of a pro 
rata apportionment in the event of tortfeasors of unequal fault, yet con-
cluded the matter was beyond its control. 
We are sympathetic to the proposition that where joint tortfeasors bear 
different degrees of responsibility for a plaintiff's injuries, it is more eq-
uitable to apportion their liability on the basis of comparative fault. How-
ever, it is the Legislature's prerogative to make such a change in our law, 
not ours. We therefore agree with the judge below that General Laws 
chapter 23lB, section 2, bars any consideration of the relative fault of a 
codefendant in assessing his or her pro rate share of the damages. 13 
Cantu predicated his equity argument upon the specific language of 
section 2(c) of the contribution statute which provides that "principles of 
equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply." 14 Although based 
upon the language of the statute, this argument was rejected easily. The 
Legislature was unequivocal in stating in section 2(a) that "relative de-
grees of fault shall not be considered" and there is nothing in section 
2(c), the Court reasoned, which "qualifies this directive by giving courts 
the discretion to consider fault if equity so requires." 15 The Court relied 
upon the stated intent of the Commissioners on uniform state laws in 
determining the limited scope of section 2(c): "According to its drafters, 
the purpose of § 2(c) was to make clear 'that except as limited by the 
section, principles of equity shall control. The common situation with 
which the courts would be concerned here is that involving insolvency 
of a potential contributor. "' 16 This view has wide acceptance. As the 
Court further noted, "Cantu [could] not point to any court which has 
solely relied on the language in § 2(c) to introduce comparative fault 
principles into the contribution system despite § 2(a)'s clear prohibition 
of such considerations. " 17 
Lastly, the Court rejected Cantu's due process and equal protection 
11 /d. at 79-80, 478 N.E.2d at 931-32. 
12 /d. (citing Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 430-33 (Alaska 1979); 
Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So.2d 386, 393 (Fla. 1975); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. General 
Motors Corp., 65 Hawaii 428, 653 P.2d 96 (1982)). 
13 /d. at 81, 478 N.E.2d at 933. 
14 G.L. c. 231B, § 2(c). 
15 Zeller, 395 Mass. at 82, 478 N.E.2d at 933. 
16 /d. (quoting Commissioner's Comment, Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 
12 U.L.A. 87 (1975) (emphasis supplied by the Court). 
17 /d. at 83, 478 N.E.2d at 934. 
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arguments. Assuming without deciding that Cantu had a valid due process 
claim, 18 the Court found that Cantu had not met his "'burden of proving 
the absence of any conceivable grounds which would support the stat-
ute. "'19 The uniform act was intended to and did distribute the burden 
of liability fairly. Although apportioning damages on the basis of relative 
fault may be "a more equitable method," the Court stated, this alone 
"does not render G .L. c. 231B unconstitutional. "20 The Court dismissed 
Cantu's equal protection claim that no rational basis existed for a system 
that determined negligence by comparative fault while apportioning con-
tribution on a pro rata basis because it "overlook[ed] the fundamental 
difference between the negligence of a· plaintiff-who has contributed to 
his own harm-and the negligence of defendants who have caused injury 
to another. "21 The fundamental difference between the two situations, 
the Court stated, provides a rational basis for measuring the fault of a 
plaintiff by a standard that was different from that used to apportion 
damages among codefendants. 22 
Although the Court affirmed the judgment ordering Cantu to pay a pro 
rata contribution to ASRC, it recognized throughout its opinion that 
"strong policy considerations favor apportionment on the basis of com-
parative fault .... "23 These were not arguments that the Court could 
entertain, however, but were instead considerations properly addressed 
to the General Court. 
§ 10.20. Damages-Indemnification. In Rathbun v. Western Massachu-
setts Electric Co., 1 the plaintiffs were injured upon a city landfill when 
the body of a truck they were unloading came into contact with a high 
voltage electric transmission line of the defendant, Western Massachu-
setts Electric Company (WMEC). Tort actions were brought against both 
WMEC and the city of Pittsfield which had given WMEC an easement 
for its electrical line over the city's landfill site.2 The actions were settled 
with both defendants contributing equally to the settlement. 3 Mter set-
tlement, trial continued on the third party claims of the city and WMEC 
18 Id. at 84 n.7, 478 N.E.2d at 934 n.7 ("[It] is questionable whether a tortfeasor has a 
constitutional right to any form of contribution, let alone contribution determined by his 
relative fault."). 
19 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin Fruit Co., 388 Mass. 228, 235, 446 N.E.2d 63, 
69 (1983)). 
20 Id. at 84, 478 N.E.2d at 935. 
2t Id. at 85, 478 N.E.2d at 935. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
§ 10.20. 1 395 Mass. 361, 479 N.E.2d 1383 (1985). 
2 Id. at 362, 479 N.E.2d at 1384. 
3 Id. 
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against each other for indemnification. The trial court found both defen-
dants equally negligent, apparently because they each permitted the un-
loading activity without taking steps to protect or warn users of the 
landfill site of the hazard of the electric wires.4 The city accepted this 
judgment, but WMEC appealed. 
On appeal WMEC sought indemnification on three theories. First, 
WMEC claimed it was entitled to indemnification because it was not 
negligent. Second, even if it were negligent, WMEC claimed it was 
entitled to indemnity under an implied obligation arising under the ease-
ment deed given by the city. Finally, WMEC argued that its negligence, 
if any, did not preclude it from obtaining indemnity under the common 
law because the city was actively negligent but WMEC was not. Specif-
ically, WMEC claimed it was in the position of a landowner and therefore 
was only constructively negligent. 5 
Rejecting the first contention, the Supreme Judicial Court held that 
WMEC was properly found negligent. WMEC had control over the land 
in crucial respects.6 It had exclusive control over its transmission line 
and retained the right to protect it. Moreover, because WMEC did not 
have exclusive control over the land, it was bound to anticipate that the 
land would be used by others. In view of its "high duty of care" as a 
"transmitt[er] of electricity,"7 the Court stated the finding that WMEC 
was negligent was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, WMEC was sub-
ject to the general rule that "a person who negligently causes injury to a 
third person is not entitled to indemnification from another person who 
also negligently causes that injury. "8 Moreover, as a negligent tortfeasor 
WMEC was subject to an indemnity claim under G.L. c. 231B.9 
4Jd. 
5 ld. WMEC Brief for Appellant at 27 (citing Stewart v. Roy Bros. Inc., 358 Mass. 446, 
458, 265 N.E.2d 357, 367 (1970); Afienko v. Harvard Club of Boston, 365 Mass. 320, 336 
n.7, 312 N.E.2d 1%, 208 n.7 (1974)). 
6 The Court reserved the question of the significance that would have attached if the city 
had retained exclusive control over the premises. Rathbun, 395 Mass. at 363 n. 2, 479 
N.E.2d at 1384 n.2. 
7 Rathbun, 395 Mass. at 363, 479 N.E.2d at 1384 (citing Gelinas v. New England Power 
Co., 359 Mass. 119, 124, 268 N.E.2d 336, 340 (1971)). In an action against an electric power 
company, the Gelinas Court recognized that the duty of "[clare and diligence" varied in 
amount and degree according to the particular circumstances. Because "electricity is a 
highly dangerous force, those employing it are properly held to a correspondingly high 
degree of care in its use." Gelinas, 359 Mass. at 124, 268 N.E.2d at 340 (quoting Edgarton 
v. H. P. Welch Co., 321 Mass. 603, 610, 74 N.E.2d 674, 678 (1947)). 
8 Rathbun, 395 Mass. at 364, 479 N.E.2d at 1385. 
9 G.L. c. 231B, § l(a) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, 
where two or more persons become jointly liable in tort for the same injury to person or 
property, there shall be a right of contribuLion among them even though judgment has not 
been recovered against all or any of them." 
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WMEC' s claim that an agreement by the city to indemnify it should 
be implied from the city's deed of easement similarly was rejected with 
ease. The Court held that the ambiguous language in the deed was in-
adequate to create an implied obligation. "The general rule," the Court 
stated, "is that there must be express language creating an obligation to 
indemnify one against his own negligence. " 10 
The Court similarly was unimpressed with WMEC's argument that it 
was entitled to indemnity under common law principles because of the 
relationship of its negligence to that of the city's. WMEC claimed that it 
had "specificly [sic] delegated to the city its duty" "to maintain adequate 
clearance underneath the wires"11 and that the city had negligently al-
lowed the land to be filled in under the electric line without informing 
WMEC. Consequently, WMEC argued, the city was directly negligent in 
creating the dangerous condition while WMEC was only constructively 
negligent because it "rel[ied] upon the delegation to another of [the 
performance of] a duty of due care. " 12 Some authority did exist suggesting 
that a negligent party such as WMEC should be entitled to indemnity 
because "he nevertheless acted in good faith ... and has relied upon [a 
joint tortfeasor] to perform his active legal duty of due care."13 
In rejecting this contention, the Court first noted that indemnity has 
been allowed to one who was not free from fault only in exceptional 
cases. 14 These few instances have occurred "where the person seeking 
indemnification did not join in the negligent act of another but was 
exposed to liability because of that negligent act."15 Accordingly, it has 
sometimes been said that such indemnitees "have been only 'construc-
tively' rather than 'actually' negligent or ... have been 'derivatively' or 
'vicariously' liable rather than 'directly' liable."16 While the Court was 
unwilling to confine indemnity recovery by negligent persons to these 
specific instances, it stated that no instructive general rule could be 
formulated. Nevertheless, the Court highlighted the fact that "the indem-
nitee's negligence has been insignificant in relation to that of the indemn-
itor" in instances where such indemnification has been allowed. 17 The 
Court did not explain what it meant by "insignificant" but, as noted 
10 /d. at 365, 479 N.E.2d at 1384. 
11 WMEC Brief for Appellant at 17-20, 34. 
12 /d. at 37 (citing and discussing Lowell v. Boston & Lowell R.R. Corp., 23 Pick. (40 
Mass.) 24 (1839); Milford v. Holbrook, 9 Allen (91 Mass.) 17, 23 (1864)). 
13 /d. at 41 (quoting Boott Mills v. Boston & Maine R.R. Corp., 218 Mass. 582, 594, 106 
N.E. 680, 686 (1914)). 
14 Rathbun, 395 Mass. at 365, 479 N.E.2d at 1385. 
15 /d. 
16 /d. The Court properly observed that these distinctions may serve to state the result, 
"but hardly assist in reaching that result." /d. 
17 Rathbun, 395 Mass. at 365, 479 N.E.2d at 1385. 
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above, it was clear that WMEC's negligence here was not insignificant 
because of "the special level of care of a company transmitting electric-
ity. "18 
Although Rathbun involved tortfeasors who were found to be equally 
negligent, the Court, nevertheless, suggested in a footnote that the Leg-
islature amend the contribution act to reflect the relative degrees of fault 
among joint tortfeasors. 19 Such legislative action would not have affected 
this case, but it could offer "[fluture relief" to a "tort defendant not 
entitled to indemnity but less negligent than another defendant . . . . "20 
The Court, however, was not able to offer any such relief on a decisional 
law basis: 
An adjustment of common law indemnity principles to place all the loss on 
the more negligent of two tortfeasors would not be an improvement, and 
for us to lay down a common law rule of indemnification based on relative 
fault ... would seem to intrude on the apportionment rule of the contri-




21 ld. (citing Zeller v. Cantu, 395 Mass. 76, 82-83, 478 N.E.2d 930, 936 (1985)). 
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